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ASTRACT 
The main agency problem within modem corporations relates to the conflicts between 
managers and shareholders. In an attempt to maximize their own welfare, managers build 
empires, collect private benefits, undertake risky investment projects and entrench 
themselves, usually at the expense of shareholders. This study focuses on this type of 
conflict in corporations. There are two main objectives of this study. First, it explores the 
consequences of the principal-agent problem between managers and shareholders for 
main corporate decisions and value. Second, it investigates potential mechanisms of 
corporate governance and discusses their role in mitigating the manager-shareholder 
conflict. Using an original and very detailed dataset for a large sample of UK listed firms, 
we show that firms that operate under a weak corporate governance regime, and those run 
by entrenched managers, adopt suboptimal capital structure policies, indicate low asset 
utilization ratios and subsequently under-perform. Several aspects of corporate ownership 
structure, financial structure and managerial compensation structure are suggested as 
potential governance mechanisms or devices that can help firms resolve agency issues. It 
seems, however, that the various corporate governance mechanisms do not work in 
isolation but interact in complicated ways with each other and with other firm-specific 
characteristics (e. g. the nature of growth options). An important point that emerges from 
these findings is that the conventional method of treating governance mechanisms as 
exogenous variables in empirical models may lead to misleading inferences regarding 
their effectiveness. The use of corporate governance indexes that combine a wide set of 
governance attributes is proposed as a more appropriate way to measure corporate 
governance effectiveness. 
viii 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
The premise behind modem corporate finance is that the separation of ownership 
and control, which characterizes most medium and large corporations produces a setting 
where the interests of managers and shareholders often diverge. In the presence of 
asymmetric information and imperfect contractual relations between managers and 
shareholders, for example, managers may have incentives to pursue their own interests, 
usually at the expense of shareholders. These incentives can take several forms including 
insufficient effort (e. g. over-committing to external activities and accepting over- 
staffing), extravagant investment (e. g. engagement in pet projects and build of empires to 
the detriment of shareholders), entrenchment strategies (e. g. investing in lines of 
activities that makes managers indispensable and consistently resisting hostile takeovers) 
and self-dealing (e. g. increasing managerial private benefits through consuming perks). ' 
Modem scholars refer to the consequences of these divergences as agency costs, 
which are conventionally defined as the costs of structuring, bonding and monitoring an 
incentive contract between the principal (shareholder) and the agent (manager). 
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), a substantial body of empirical work focuses on 
the adverse effect of agency costs on a wide range of corporate policy decisions and firm 
value. It is well documented in the literature, for instance, that firms in which the interests 
of managers and shareholders are not perfectly aligned prefer lower than optimal 
leverage, choose longer maturity debt, hold large amounts of cash, pay lower dividends, 
over-invest and exhibit significant underperformance. 2 
1 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Tirole (2006) for an analytical discussion on the various ways in 
which management may not act in the firm's best interest. 
2 See, for example, Berger et aL (1997), Brounen et aL (2006) and Datta et aL (2006) for evidence on the 
capital structure decision, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) for the cash-holdings decision, Hu and Kumar (2004) 
for the dividend decision, Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) for the investment decision and Gompers et aL 
(2003), Davies et aL (2005) and Core et aL (2006) for accounting and stock price performance. 
2 
Corporate governance, which deals with identifying potential mechanisms by which 
shareholders of a corporation exercise control over management such that their interests 
are protected, has recently attracted the keen interest of academics and policy makers 
around the world. The increasing globalization, the deregulation and integration of capital 
markets, the recent financial crisis in Asia and elsewhere, and the spectacular corporate 
failures (e. g. Enron, WorldCom, Xerox and Parmalat) have fuelled the already vigorous 
debate on how to minimize the manager-shareholder conflict and design an effective 
corporate governance system that will promote sustainable economic efficiency and 
growth. In this regard, several elements of firm ownership structure (e. g. managerial 
ownership, ownership concentration, owner type), board structure (e. g. proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board, board size, CEO duality) and financial structure 
(e. g. leverage and dividend) have been suggested as potential mechanisms that can help 
align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. 3 
Despite the substantial evidence on these issues, it has nevertheless been difficult to 
conduct irrefutable tests of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate 
policy decisions and firm value. 4 One explanation of the lack of consensus might be the 
difficulties entailed in modelling potential interactions among governance mechanisms. 
Existing studies usually treat several ownership, board and financial structure 
characteristics as independent mechanisms or devices for resolving agency issues. There 
might be substitute or complementary ways, however, of reducing agency costs such that 
the impact of one mechanism may depend on the chosen level of the other. For instance, 
3 See Gillan, 2006 for a survey of recent research. 
4 The lack of consensus regarding the governance role of several firm specific characteristics is clearly 
expressed in a number of survey papers on corporate governance (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; John and Senbet, 1998; Denis, 2001; Gillan, 2006). 
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if a certain combination of non-executive directors on the board (which reduces agency 
costs through monitoring) and managerial ownership (which reduces agency costs 
through providing incentives to managers) has the best aggregate impact on value 
creation, providing more holdings to managers may be costly when the proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board is already high. This is because very high levels of 
managerial ownership may lead to managerial entrenchment. In a similar spirit, debt and 
managerial ownership may work independently as effective instruments that reduce the 
level of agency costs, though the use of high levels of debt may crowd out the 
effectiveness of managerial ownership. This can be attributed to the fact that 
diversification considerations prevent managers from accumulating too much stock. 
Another problem relates to the measurement issue of agency costs. The majority of 
empirical studies on corporate governance focus on the implicit assumption that better 
governance delivers better firm value through reducing the agency costs that arise due to 
the misaligned interests between managers and shareholders. 5 However, these studies do 
not tackle the measurement issue of the principal variable of interest, namely agency 
costs, but instead agency costs are only inferred. An obvious explanation, as Ang et aL 
(2000) point out, is that the Jensen and Meckling's zero agency cost base cannot be found 
among the sample of publicly traded corporations. Recent studies attempt to fill the gap 
in the existing literature on corporate governance by proposing several absolute and 
relative proxies for agency costs. Ang et al. (2003), for example, look at firms that are not 
5 Although the primary agency relationship in large corporations is between managers and shareholders, a 
similar agency relationship exists between shareholders and debt-holders. Simply put, debt-holders suffer 
economic loss if the debtor attempts further borrowing (or in the worse case goes bankrupt) (see Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). The analysis of this study and the corporate governance mechanisms suggested as 
partial solutions to the agency problem refer mainly the managerial-shareholder conflict. As explained later 
in the study, however, we do not rule out the possibility that some of these mechanisms may also influence 
the debt-holder-shareholder conflict. 
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publicly traded so as to identify the no-agency-cost benchmark. They then measure 
agency costs as the difference in the efficiency ratio (sales to total assets) and expense 
ratio (expenses to sales) between a firm whose manager is the sole owner (no-agency- 
costs benchmark) and a firrn whose manager owns less than 100 per cent of equity. 
Similar proxies are used in more recent studies by Singh and Davidson (2003) and 
Flemming et aL (2005). Despite the valuable insights provided by these studies, clearly 
more research is required on the deten-ninants on agency costs in order to identify which 
specific mechanisms are most effective in improving governance. 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which the manager- 
shareholders conflict can be costly, in terms of underperformance and sub-optimal capital 
structure choice, and also identify those mechanisms and devices that can help firm 
attenuate such a conflict. Three important aspects of our study, which differentiate it from 
previous research, are the following. First, we attempt to take into consideration the 
complicated ways in which corporate governance mechanisms interact with each other 
and with other firm-specific characteristics, e. g. the nature of growth opportunities. In 
doing so, we construct several indexes (governance and entrenchment indexes) that are 
based on a wide set of corporate governance attributes and measure managerial ability 
and incentives to use their discretion and expropriate wealth from shareholders. This 
approach extends earlier studies that have mainly focused on only a few governance 
variables ignoring the cumulative impact of these influences on agency costs, corporate 
policy decisions and corporate performance. 
Second, we attempt to establish a direct link between corporate governance and 
agency costs by investigating the empirical determinants of agency costs, rather than 
5 
focusing solely on capital structure and corporate performance. In the spirit of Ang et al. 
(2000), we hypothesize that focusing on agency costs directly rather than looking only at 
corporate policy decisions or performance is likely to provide useful insights into our 
understanding of the extent of agency conflicts inside large corporations, and also help 
identify those firm-characteristics that can work as effective governance mechanisms or 
devices. 
Finally, to conduct our empirical investigation, we put forward sophisticated cross- 
sectional and panel data methodologies that help control for the endogeneity problem, 
which can arise in this context for several reasons (e. g. reverse causality, unobserved 
heterogeneity). In particular, we use the average cross-sectional regression approach 
suggested by Ragan and Zingales (1995) and the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation procedure suggested by Arellano and Bond (1992) and Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). We believe that these two methods will provide us with accurate and robust 
empirical results. 
Our study uses a uniquely constructed dataset that includes detailed and up-to-date 
information on the ownership structure, board structure and managerial compensation 
structure of a large sample of UK listed companies. Several factors combine to make UK 
a particularly interesting environment to study. First, ownership in the UK is quite 
dispersed. This is mainly due to the existing takeover code and the favourable law to 
minority shareholders, which both discourage capital accumulation. Financial institutions 
are the most significant equity holders in the UK but there is a great deal of evidence that 
some types financial institutions are preoccupied by short-termism. and, therefore, they do 
not add much in corporate governance (Black and Coffee, 1994; Short and Keasey, 1997; 
6 
Franks et al., 2001). Second, UK boards of directors are generally characterized as 
corporate devices that provide weak disciplinary function mainly due to weak powers that 
enforce fiduciary responsibilities on directors. Third, following several corporate 
scandals that took place in the 1980s and early 1990s, the UK witnessed an intensive 
discussion of corporate governance issues and several reports in the form of "codes of 
best practice" (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998 and Higgs, 2003). 
Consequently, the investigation of agency issues and the effectiveness of the alternative 
governance mechanisms in the UK, in a period that has witnessed an intensive discussion 
of corporate governance issues, would be of considerable importance. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between 
internal corporate governance and corporate performance using a sample of 932 UK 
listed companies over the period 1999-2003. While there is a large body of literature on 
the governance-performance relationship, Considerable confusion still exists as to 
whether specific governance mechanisms can provide adequate safeguards for investors' 
wealth. There is no consensus, for example, on the exact type of relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm value. 6 Prior studies also ignore important aspects of the 
capital and compensation structure, namely short-term debt and managerial 
compensation, which can potentially work as important governance devices. Chapter 2 
aims to address this gap in the literature by providing a detailed investigation of the 
6 It has been shown, for example, that managerial ownership can help align the interests of managers with 
those of shareholders by constraining the consumption of perks and the engagement in sub-optimal 
investment policies (incentive-alignment effect). However, managerial ownership is not always a safe bet 
for resolving agency issues. Several studies demonstrate that at higher levels of managerial ownership 
managers exert insufficient effort, collect private benefits and entrench themselves, leading to a negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and performance (entrenchment effect). Existing empirical 
research on the subject, however, does not shed much light on the exact nature of the relationship between 
the two and, hence, we do not know which of the effects (alignment and entrenchment) will dominate the 
other and at what levels of managerial ownership. 
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impact of ownership, board structures and compensation structures on corporate 
performance. More specifically, this chapter attempts to provide new insights on the 
subject by empirically investigating the role of debt-maturity structure of firms and 
managerial compensation in affecting corporate performance. Potential interaction effects 
among several corporate governance mechanisms are also considered. 
The results in chapter 2 support that managerial ownership can be treated as an 
important device for providing managers with incentives to maximize the value of the 
firm, though the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance 
is non-monotonic (managers move from alignment to entrenchment and then to 
alignment again as their holdings increase). Short-term debt and managerial 
compensation company performance are also found to be significantly related to 
performance. Finally, there is strong evidence that managerial ownership and managerial 
compensation work as substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems and, 
therefore, generating good performance. 
Chapter 3 attempts to establish a link between internal corporate governance and 
one of the most important corporate policy decisions, namely capital structure. The 
capital structure is important in the context of our analysis mainly for two reasons. First, 
leverage itself can play the role of strong corporate governance tool. For example, as 
Harvey et al. (2004) point out, the use of debt directly reduces overinvestment or allows 
firms to signal that they do not or will not over-invest. Second, the empirical literature on 
capital structure has identified strong links between leverage and several firm-specific 
characteristics such as size, growth opportunities, profitability and asset tangibility, 
though, relatively little is known on the impact of corporate governance on the capital 
8 
structure decision. The main theme in this chapter then is to empirically investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and leverage and provide insights into the 
following research questions: Do well-governed firms adopt different financial policies 
from poorly-governed firms? If yes, which are the factors that can explain such a 
discrepancy9 
To conduct our empirical investigation, we construct a "governance index" for 946 
UK listed companies over the period 1999-2003, which represents a score based on the 
existence of perceived good governance attributes, such as ownership concentration, 
existence of non-executive directors and board size. The empirical findings, which are 
based on both average cross-sectional and dynamic panel data estimation techniques, 
indicate that well-governed firms indicate much higher leverage ratios. A potential 
explanation of this finding is that well- governed firms have a better reputation, easier 
access to capital and other markets and, in general, suffer from lower agency costs of 
debt. This leads to a lower cost of external finance and a relatively higher level of 
leverage in their capital structure. 
The results also point to an indirect effect of governance on leverage. In particular, 
it seems that managers, depending on their equity holdings, have incentives to adjust to or 
deviate from an optimal leverage ratio but the exact impact of these incentives on 
leverage are likely to be determined by firm-specific governance characteristics. There is 
evidence, for example, that managerial incentives to choose a low leverage ratio that 
serves their needs (e. g. insulates them from the disciplinary role of debt) but does not 
maximize the value of the firm are weaker in firms that operate under a strong corporate 
governance environment. Finally, consistent with the results reported in recent capital 
9 
structure studies, our dynamic panel data regressions show that UK firms adjust partially 
towards a target leverage ratio. 
Following the lead of a few influential papers written recently (in particular Ang et 
aL, 2000 and Singh and Davidson, 2003) chapters 4 and 5 concentrate on the empirical 
determinants of agency costs rather than focusing on a particular corporate policy 
decision or firm value. In particular, Chapter 4, which is an extension of the study by 
Singh and Davidson (2003), empirically investigates the impact of capital structure, 
ownership, board composition and managerial compensation on two specific proxies for 
agency costs, namely asset turnover and expense ratio. A key aspect of this study is the 
analysis of the role of growth opportunities in influencing the effectiveness of internal 
governance mechanisms in reducing agency costs. We hypothesize that if agency 
problems are associated with greater information asymmetry, a common problem in high- 
growth firms, the corporate governance mechanisms that are likely to mitigate such 
problems are expected to be more effective for high-growth firms. Likewise, if agency 
costs are due to the use of free-cash flow, a common problem in low-growth firms, the 
corporate governance mechanisms that are likely to mitigate such problems are expected 
to be more effective for low-growth firms 
The empirical results in chapter 4 indicate that in addition to managerial ownership 
and ownership concentration, which have been widely suggested as potential corporate 
governance mechanisms, debt maturity and managerial compensation also play an 
important role in mitigating agency related problems for UK firms. Furthermore, there is 
strong evidence that specific governance mechanisms are not homogeneous but vary with 
growth opportunities. For instance, we find that the alignment effect of managerial 
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ownership is more pronounced in high-growt1h finns. This finding complements earlier 
research by Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993) and Lasfer (2002) showing 
that high-growth firms are likely to prefer incentive mechanisms (e. g. managerial 
ownership) whereas low-growth firms mainly focus on monitoring mechanisms (e. g. 
short-term debt) for mitigating agency problems. 
Chapter 5 builds on the analysis of Chapter 4 to investigate the impact of 
managerial entrenchment on agency costs. This chapter contributes to the existing 
literature on agency costs in two important ways. First, a uniquely constructed proxy for 
managerial entrenchment is put forward, which is based on a set of variables that are 
likely to affect managerial ability and incentives to use their discretion and expropriate 
wealth from shareholders. This variable is, then regressed against asset turnover to 
analyze whether the level of agency costs changes with managerial entrenchment. 
Second, the analysis is based on a dynamic panel data empirical model, which is 
estimated using the GMM methodology (Arellano and Bond, 1992). Such an approach 
helps control for the potential endogeneity problem that is likely to arise if a) observable 
as well as unobservable shocks affecting agency costs can also affect managerial 
entrenchment as well as other firm characteristics used in the agency model, including 
dividend payouts, leverage, and market-to-book ratio b) observed relations between 
agency costs and its determinants reflect the effects of agency costs on the latter rather 
than vice versa (see also Cho, 1998; Himmelberg, 1999; and Lemmons and Lins, 2003). 
The dynamic model also allows us to study whether agency costs are persistent over 
time and, most importantly, whether there is a level of agency costs that is perceived by 
managers as an equilibrium level of agency costs. It is argued that this equilibrium, if 
II 
any, is implied by a trade-off between the (private) benefits of expropriation (e. g. 
managers may garner overcompensation) and the expected (private) costs of such actions 
to managers (e. g. the cost that is borne to managers after the reduction in the value of the 
firm). Tackling such a question is important because if there is indeed an optimal level of 
expropriation from managers' point of view, this may partly explain why many firms 
deliberately practice bad governance. 
The empirical findings in chapter 5 show that there is a strong negative relationship 
between managerial entrenchment and our inverse proxy for agency costs, namely asset 
turnover ratio. There is also evidence that short-term debt and dividend payments work as 
effective corporate governance mechanisms or devices for UK firms. Finally, the findings 
reveal that agency costs are persistent over time and that there is a level of agency costs is 
perceived by managers as an equilibrium level of agency costs. The results are robust to 
a number of alternative specifications, including varying measures of managerial 
entrenchment and agency costs. 
Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions of this work. In particular, we emphasize 
how moral hazard problems within an agency framework can lead to underperformance 
and sub-optimal corporate policy decisions. We also suggest potential corporate 
governance mechanism or devices that can help firms mitigate agency related problems. 
Finally, in this chapter we discuss several promising avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
0 Internal corporate governance mechanisms and corporate 
performance: Evidence for UK firms 
13 
2.1 Introduction 
The relation between corporate governance and firm value is a subject of an important 
and continuous debate in the corporate finance literature. The current study provides a 
detailed examination of the impact of managerial ownership and several other potential 
corporate governance mechanisms on corporate performance. This study makes two 
contributions to the literature. First, it explores the roles of debt maturity structure and 
managerial compensation in controlling agency costs. It is widely acknowledged that 
short-term debt may be more effective than long-term debt in reducing the expected costs 
of the underinvestment problem of Myers (1977) .7 Additionally, short-term 
debt may be 
more useful in reducing free-cash-flow problems and in signalling high quality to 
outsiders (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991). Accordingly, in our analysis, we consider the 
maturity structure of debt as a potential governance device that can help attenuate the 
agency related costs. 
Managerial compensation can also work as an effective corporate governance 
mechanism. As noted in Core et al. (2001) and Murphy (1999), managerial compensation 
can attract, retain and motivate management and, therefore, improve the long-term 
performance of the firm. Put differently, a manager that receives an attractive 
compensation package will presumably be less likely, ceteris paribus, to exert insufficient 
effort and risk the loss of his job. Despite the apparent importance of these issues, the 
number of empirical studies that emphasize on them is very restricted. 
7 It is argued that firm with greater growth opportunities should have more short-term debt because 
shortening debt maturity would make it more likely that debt will mature before any opportunity to exercise 
the growth options. Consistent with this prediction, there are several empirical debt maturity studies that 
find a negative relation between maturity and growth opportunities (see, e. g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; 
Guedes and Opler, 1996; and Ozkan, 2000 among others). 
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The second contribution of this chapter concerns the examination of potential 
interaction effects between managerial ownership and other governance mechanisms 
available to firms. Most of the existing studies on the subject describe how each 
mechanism works in isolation but there is very little evidence on how these mechanisms 
interact. There are substitute and complementary ways of reducing agency costs, for 
example, such that the impact of one mechanism on firm value depends on the chosen 
level of the other. The main question we address in this chapter is whether governance 
mechanisms work as substitutes or complements in mitigating agency problems and, 
hence generating higher firm value. In particular, we examine whether board structure, 
debt maturity and managerial compensation can work as substitutes for managerial 
ownership in their control role. 8 
To conduct our empirical investigation, we use a unique dataset that includes, 
among others, detailed information on the ownership structure, board structure and 
managerial concentration structure for 962 UK listed companies. Our results support the 
existence of a non-linear impact of both executive ownership and executive 
compensation on company performance. Specifically, we find that executive 
management move from alignment, to entrenchment, to alignment as their ownership 
stakes and compensation increase. Debt-maturity structure is also found to be 
significantly associated with performance. Finally, there is strong evidence that executive 
ownership and executive compensation work as substitute mechanisms in mitigating 
$On this point, our paper is similar to the study by Mapper and Love (2003) who consider interaction 
effects between internal and external governance mechanisms. In particular, Mapper and Love (2003) look 
at potential interaction between firm-level governance and country-level investor protection and conclude 
that firm-level governance matters more in countries with weak shareholder protection and poor judicial 
efficiency. Similar ideas are also employed in Both et al. (2000) who investigate whether regulation can be 
used to substitute internal governance mechanisms. 
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agency problems and, therefore, generating good performance. The rest of our results are 
in line with those reported by other studies for UK finns. 9 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 2.2 we review the 
related literature and establish our empirical hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the data 
and the variables used in our analysis. Section 2.4 presents our empirical results. Finally 
section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
In what follows, we discuss the potential interaction between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate performance. In addition to the usual suspects, 
namely managerial ownership, ownership concentration and board structure, we 
emphasize on the potential impact of debt financing (in particular short-terin debt) and 
managerial compensation on corporate performance. 
2.2.1 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership has been suggested as a potential incentive mechanism that helps 
align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Based on the convergence of 
interest hypothesis, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose a positive and linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance. Subsequent 
studies extend Jensen and Mcckling's idea and suggest that the relationship between 
managerial ownership and agency costs is non-monotonic (see, for example, Morck et al., 
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990,1995). In particular, it has been shown that, at low 
9 For example, we find that non-executive directors have a significant positive effect on corporate 
performance. Furthermore, we find a negative relationship between board size and firm performance, 
indicating that small boards are more cfficient than large boards 
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levels of managerial ownership, managerial ownership aligns managers' and outside 
shareholders' interests by reducing managerial incentives for perk consumption, 
utilization of insufficient effort and engagement in non-maximizing projects (alignment 
effect). However, after some level of managerial ownership, managers exert insufficient 
effort, collect private benefits and entrench themselves at the expense of other investors 
(entrenchment effect). 
In the context of our analysis we propose a non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and corporate performance. However, theory does not shed much 
light on the exact nature of the relationship between the two and, hence, we do not know 
which of the effects (alignment and entrenchment) will dominate the other and at what 
levels of managerial ownership. We, therefore, carry out a preliminary investigation 
about the pattern of the relationship between managerial ownership and agency costs. 
Figure I presents the way in which the two variables are associated. It seems that at low 
levels of managerial ownership, Tobin's Q (our proxy for corporate performance) and 
managerial ownership are positively related. However, after managerial ownership 
exceeds the 10 per cent level, the relationship turns from positive to negative. Another 
turning point is observed at around 20 per cent of managerial ownership. 
To control for the non-linear aspect of managerial ownership, we include the level, 
the square and the cube of managerial ownership in our empirical model as predictors of 
corporate performance. 
2.2.2 Ownership Concentration 
Another alternative for alleviating agency problems is through concentrated ownership. 
This rests on the idea that shareholders should t ake an active role themselves in 
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monitoring management. However, given that the monitoring benefits for shareholders 
are proportionate to their equity stakes (see, for example, Grossman and Hart, 1988), a 
small or average shareholder has little or no incentive to exert monitoring behaviour. In 
contrast, shareholders with substantial stakes have more incentive to supervise 
management and can do so more effectively (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). 
However, there are also several costs of holding a large stake, such as the potential 
agency problems between large and minority shareholders. Such problems mainly arise 
when large shareholders gain nearly full control of a corporation and engage themselves 
in self-dealing expropriation procedures at the expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). 10 Other problems associated with large stakes include the decrease in 
a firm's diversification, market liquidation and stock's ability to grow. 
In order to analyze the impact of ownership concentration on corporate 
performance, we include a variable that refers to the sum of stakes of shareholders with 
equity stake greater than 3 per cent in our regression equation. II 
2.2.3 Board of Directors 
The effectiveness of a board as a corporate governance mechanism depends on its size 
and composition. Large boards are usually more powerful than small boards and, hence, 
are considered necessary for organizational effectiveness. As Pearce and Zahra (1991) 
points out, large powerful boards help strengthen the link between corporations and their 
10 As Gomez (2000) points out, these expropriation incentives are stronger when corporate governance of 
public companies insulates large shareholders from takeover threats and the legal system does not protect 
minority shareholders because of either poor laws or poor enforcement of laws. 11 Or empirical findings are qualitative similar when 5 per cent and 10 per cent thresholds are used. 
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environments, provide counsel and advice regarding strategic options for the firm and 
play a crucial role in creating corporate identity. Other studies, however, question the 
effectiveness of large boards and show that small boards are more effective. The premise 
underlying this argument is that large boards make coordination, communication and 
decision-making more cumbersome than it is in smaller boards. Recent studies by 
Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Beiner et al. (2004) support such a view 
empirically. 
In addition to board size, the effectiveness of a board may also depend on its 
composition. One hypothesis, for example, is that boards with a significant proportion of 
non-executive directors are more effective in monitoring management and, therefore, 
they can limit the exercise of managerial discretion. Consistent with this view, Byrd and 
Hickman (1992) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find a positive relationship between 
the percentage of non-executive directors on the board and corporate performance. 
12 ne 
opposite hypothesis assumes that boards dominated by non-executive directors are not 
effective. This rests on the view that non-executive directors are usually characterized by 
lack of information about the firm, do not bring the requisite skills to the job and, hence, 
prefer to play a less confrontational role rather than a more critical monitoring one (see, 
for example, Agrawal and Knoeker, 1996 and Franks et al., 2001). 13 
12 The existence of non-executive directors on the board may also lead to better stock price performance 
and turnover of inefficient management. Lin et al. (2003) propose a positive share price reaction to the 
appointment of outside directors, especially when board ownership is low and the appointee possesses 
strong ex ante monitoring incentives. Dahya et al. (2002) find that top-manager turnover increases as the 
fraction of outside directors increases. 
13 Such an argument is likely to be consistent with the governance system prevailing in the UK market 
given that UK legislation encourages non-executive directors to be inactive by imposing no fiduciary 
obligations on them. Franks et al. (2001) confirm this view by providing evidence on the non-disciplinary 
role of non-executive directors in the UK. 
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The separated or not roles of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the 
board (COB) also affect the degree independency of a board of directors. It is argued that 
separated roles of CEO and COB can lead to better board perfonnance and, hence, fewer 
agency conflicts. The Cadbury (1992) report on corporate governance stresses this issue 
and recommends that CEO and COB should be two distinct jobs. However, empirical 
studies by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Weir et al. (2002), do not indicate any 
significant association between CEO - COB duality and corporate performance in the 
UK. 
To test the effectiveness of the board of directors in mitigating agency problems 
and, therefore, generating better performance we include three variables in our empirical 
model: a) the total number of directors (board size), b) the ratio of the number of non- 
executive directors to the number of total directors and c) a dummy variable which takes 
the value of I when the roles of CEO and COB are not separated and 0 otherwise. 
2.2.4 Debt Financing 
Agency problems within a firm are usually related to free cash-flow and asymmetric 
information problems. 14 It is widely acknowledged that debt servicing obligations, 
especially those that are privately placed (e. g. bank debt), can help reduce agency 
problems of this sort (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; and Ross, 1977). The announcement of a 
bank credit agreement, for example, conveys positive news to the stock market about a 
borrower's worthiness and, therefore, decreases the asymmetric information between 
borrowers and investors. Moreover, it is argued that bank debt has an advantage in 
comparison to publicly traded debt in monitoring a firm's activities and in collecting and 
14 See, for example, Jensen (1986) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
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processing information. Accordingly, Fama (1985) finds that bank lenders have a 
comparative advantage in minimizing information costs and getting access to information 
not otherwise publicly available. 
In addition to debt source, the maturity structure of debt may also influence agency 
costs. Short-term debt may be more useful than long-term debt in reducing free cash flow 
problems and signalling high quality to outsiders. As Myers (1977) suggests, agency 
conflicts such as the underinvestment problem can be curtailed with short-term debt. 
Flannery (1986) argues that firms with large potential information asymmetries are likely 
to issue short-term debt because of the larger information costs associated with long-term 
debt. Short-term debt can also be advantageous especially for high-quality companies due 
to its low refinancing risk (Diamond, 199 1). 
We include the ratio of bank debt to total debt and the ratio of short-term debt to 
total debt in our empirical model so as to approximate the lender's ability to mitigate 
agency problems. Also, we include the ratio of total debt to total assets (leverage) to 
approximate the lender's incentive to monitor. In general, as leverage increases, so does 
the risk of default by the firm and, hence, the lenders' incentive to monitor the firm. 
2.2.5 Managerial Compensation 
Recent studies by Core et al. (2003) and Murphy (1999) suggest that compensation 
contracts can motivate managers to take actions that maximize shareholders' wealth. In 
the absence of asymmetric information, shareholders would be able to directly observe 
managers' actions and, therefore, no incentive mechanisms would be required to align the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders. However, in a real life framework firms 
are subject to severe asymmetric information and managerial agency costs, which lead to 
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the need of both equity and compensation related incentives. An increase in managerial 
compensation may reduce managerial agency costs in the sense that satisfied managers 
will be less likely, ceteris paribus, to exert insufficient effort, expropriate wealth and, in 
this way, risk the loss of their job. Consistent with this view Jensen and Murthy (1990) 
and Mehran (1995) report a statistically significant relationship between managerial pay 
and corporate performance. In a similar spirit, Hutchinson and Gul (2004) show that 
managerial compensation moderate the negative association between growth 
opportunities and firm value and Chen (2003) finds the annual stock bonus is strongly 
associated with the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance. 
Another approach to studying managerial compensation is to consider it as part of 
the agency problem rather than as an instrument for addressing the agency problem (see, 
for example, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). That is, despite its potentially positive impact on 
firm value, compensation may also work as "infectious greed" that creates an 
environment ripe for abuse, especially when it reaches significantly high levels. For 
example, remuneration packages usually include extreme benefits for managers such as 
the use of a private jet, golf club membership, entertainment and other expenses and 
apartment purchases, which may inflate agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. Concerns about excessive compensation packages and their negative impact 
on corporate performance have lead to the establishment of basic recommendations in the 
form of "best practices" with which firms should comply to reduce the problem with 
excessive compensation. 15 
15 In the case of the UK market, for example, one of the basic recommendations of the Cadbury (1992) 
report was the establishment of an independent compensation committee. Also, in a later report, the 
Greenbury (1995) report, specific proposal about remuneration issues were made. For example, an issue 
that was stressed relates to the recent rate of increase in managerial compensation. In the case of the US 
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To capture both the alignment and the entrenchment effects of managerial 
compensation we allow for a non-linear relationship between managerial compensation 
and agency costs in our model. Similar to the case of managerial ownership, we carry out 
a preliminary investigation about the pattern of the relationship between salary and 
Tobin's Q. The results of such a task, as shown in Figure 2, point to a non-monotonic 
relationship. 16 We measure salary as the ratio of the total salary paid to executive 
directors to total assets. We also include a dummy variable, which takes the value of I 
when a firm pays options or bonuses to managers and 0 otherwise. Including such a 
dummy variable enables us to test whether or not options and bonuses themselves 
provide incentives to managers. 
2.2.6 Interactions among governance mechanisms 
While there is a large body of literature that describes how each governance mechanism 
works in isolation, we know little about how they interact, In this study we hypothesize 
that several of the above mentioned governance mechanisms may be interrelated. 
Managerial ownership and managerial compensation, for example, are mechanisms that 
provide managers with incentives to limit managerial discretiorf and maximize the value 
of the firm. To the extent that this is true, managerial ownership and managerial 
compensation should work as substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems. That 
is, if a certain combination of managerial ownership and managerial compensation has 
market, the set of "best practises" includes, among others, the establishment of a compensation committee 
so that transparency and disclosure can be guaranteed (same practice as in the UK) and the substitution of 
stock options as compensation components with other tools that promote the long-term value of the 
company. 
16 A similar preliminary analysis is carried out so as to check potential non-linearities concerning the 
relationship between the rest of the internal governance mechanisms and agency costs. Our results (not 
reported) indicate that none of them is related to Tobin's Q in a non-linear way. 
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the best aggregate impact on firm value, providing more holdings to managers may be 
costly when managerial compensation is already high. The rational behind this argument 
is that very high levels of managerial ownership may lead to managerial entrenchment 
(see, for example, Morck et al, 1988 and McConnell and Servaes, 1990). 
In the analysis of the current study we initially focus on the role of managerial 
ownership as a corporate governance mechanism for the case of UK firms. We then 
analyze whether other incentive mechanisms (e. g. managerial compensation) or 
monitoring mechanisms (e. g. non-executive directors and debt-maturity) can work as 
substitutes for managerial ownership in alleviating agency problems and, hence, 
improving corporate perfon-nance ("Substitute Hypothesis"). To the extent that the 
substitutable hypothesis holds, we expect that the alignment effect of managerial 
ownership is less pronounced in cases of firms with highly independent boards of 
directors and high levels of short-term debt and managerial compensation. Furthermore, 
the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership, if any, is expected to be less 
pronounced in cases of firm that have strong governance mechanisms in place, which can 
provide adequate safeguards for investors' wealth. 
2.3 Sample and Variables 
2.3.1 Sample 
Initially, we use a sample that includes all firms that are listed in the London Stock 
Exchange over the period 1999-2003. We use two data sources for the compilation of our 
sample. Accounting data and data on the market value of equity are collected from 
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Datastream database. Specifically, we use Datastream to collect information on firm size, 
market value of equity, book value of equity, short-term debt, bank debt and total debt. 
Information on firm's ownership, board and managerial compensation structure is 
derived from the Hemscott Guru Academic database. This database provides financial 
data for the UK's top 300,000 companies, detailed data on all directors of UK listed 
companies, live regulatory and AFX News feeds and share price charts and trades. In 
specific, we use the Hemscott Guru Academic to get detailed information on the level of 
managerial ownership (executive and non-executive), ownership concentration, size and 
composition of the board, managerial salary, bonus, options and other benefits. Although 
data on directors are provided in a spreadsheet format, infonnation for each item is given 
in a separate file, which complicates data collection. For example, in order to get 
information about the number of shares held by executive directors we have to combine 
two different files: a) the file that contains data on the number of shares held by each 
director and b) the file that provides information about the type of each directorship (e. g. 
executive director vs. non-executive director). Also, we have to take into account the fact 
that several directors in the UK hold positions in more than one company. Similar 
complications arise when we attempt to collect information about the composition of the 
board and the remuneration package provided to executive directors. 
The way in which our final sample is compiled is the following. First, we match the 
data from the two databases. Second, missing firm-year observations for any variable in 
the model during the sample period are dropped. Third, the dataset was cleaned of 
outliers. Several parts of the dataset were thoroughly inspected. For the case of 
managerial ownership, for example, information was cross checked with other sources 
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(Price Waterhouse Corporate Register) for firms with particularly high levels of shares 
help by executive directors (e. g. greater than 80 per cent). In case when information from 
the two sources did not match, this observation was dropped from the sample. For the 
case of ownership concentration, we excluded those firms whose reported level of 
ownership concentration exceeded 100 per cent. After cross-checking with the Price 
Waterhouse Corporate Register these were mainly firms with dual class ownership. As 
for the accounting variables, we restrict our analysis to values for each variable that lie 
between the I" and the 99h percentile to avoid the problem with extreme values. Finally, 
financial firms are excluded from the sample, because of their unique operating and 
regulatory conditions. These criteria left us with 962 fin-ns for the current analysis. 
2.3.2 Variables 
Following Lins (2003), we measure firm performance as the ratio of market value of 
equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity to the book value of 
assets (TOBIN'S Q). 17 We consider a wide set of potential governance mechanisms or 
devices as predictors of our proxy for TOBIN'S Q. These are the following: the 
percentage of shares held by executive directors (EXOWNER), the percentage of shares 
held by non-executive directors (NONEXOWNER), the ratio of the number of non- 
executive directors to the total number of directors (NON-EXEC), the number of 
directors on the board (in logarithm)18 (BOARDSIZE), the percentage sum of stakes of 
17 The results are robust, however, to alternative definitions for Tobin's Q e. g. the ratio of market value of 
equity plus the book value of preference shares and the book value of debt to the book value of assets (see, 
Davies et al. (2005) for details). 
18 We use a log specification for the board size variable, based upon the convex association between board 
size and market value suggested by other studies. 
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all shareholders with equity ownership greater than 3 per cent (CONCENTR), the ratio of 
total cash compensation that is provided to executive directors to total assets (expressed 
as a percentage) (REMUN), a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when the roles 
of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board (COB) are not separated and 
0 otherwise (CEO-DUMMY), the ratio of total debt to total assets (LEVERAGE), the 
ratio of short-term debt to total debt (SHORTDEBT) and the ratio of bank debt to total 
debt (BANKDEBT). Also, we control for firm size, measured as the logarithm of the 
market value of equity (SIZE). 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for all these variables. The average Tobin's 
Q ratio is 2.05. The average value for managerial ownership is 14.59 per cent, of which 
the average proportion of stakes held by executive (non-executive) directors is 10.53 per 
cent (4.27 per cent). Ownership concentration reaches the level of 37.56 per cent, on 
average, in our sample. Also, the average proportion of non-executive directors is 49.81 
per cent and the average board size is 6.95 directors. Finally, we were able to identify 
only 79 firms out of the final 962 (8.21 per cent) in which the positions of CEO and COB 
are not separated. As far as the capital structure variables are concerned, the average 
proportion of short-term debt on firm's capital structure is 47.77 per cent, the proportion 
of bank debt is 54.13 per cent and the leverage ratio is 19.74 per cent. In general, the 
descriptive statistics are in line with those reported in other studies for UK firms (see, for 
example, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Lasfer, 2002 and Short and Keasey, 1999). 
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2.4 Empirical Results 
We examine the determinants of corporate performance by utilizing the cross sectional 
average methodology proposed by Rajan and Zingalcs (1995). In particular, the 
dependent variable is measured at some time t, while for the independent variables we 
use average-past values. Specifically, the dependent variable is measured in year 2003 
and independent variables are measured over the period 1999-2002. This approach has 
two main advantages. First, using averages in the way we construct our explanatory 
variables helps mitigate potential problems that may arise due to short-term fluctuations 
and extreme values in our data. Second, using past values reduces the likelihood of 
observed relations reflecting the effects of Tobin's Q on firm specific factors. 19 
Table 2.2 presents the results from the cross sectional analysis. We start with a non- 
linear model in terms of executive ownership (similar to the one proposed by Short and 
Keasey, 1999) in which we do not include any interaction terms (model 1). Our findings 
show that executive ownership and corporate performance are related non-linearly. 
Specifically, our results reveal that executive management move from aligriment, to 
entrenchment, to alignment as their ownership stakes in the firm increase. This result is in 
line with what is suggested by Morck et al. (1988) and Short and Keasey (1999). 
The interesting part of our results, though, is the fact that we find strong evidence 
that executive remuneration and debt maturity can help align the interests of managers 
with those of shareholders and, therefore, enhance firm value. Characteristically, the 
coefficients of remuneration (REMUN) and short-term debt (SHORT_DEBT) are 
19 One possibility, for example, is that highly profitable firms reward their managers for good past financial 
performance by giving them equity ownership. In such cases the causality runs from financial performance 
to management ownership. 
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positive and statistically significant to the I per cent level. Therefore, our empirical study 
introduces two additional potential corporate governance mechanisms available to firms. 
In model 2 we extend the empirical specification of model I by allowing for a cubic 
non-linear relationship between executive remuneration and performance. Our results 
strongly support such a relationship. In particular, in addition to managerial ownership, 
executive remuneration generates conflicting effects on managerial behaviour that have a 
measurable impact on corporate efficiency. The rest of the results of model 2 are similar 
to the ones obtained earlier. The next step is to investigate whether the nature of the 
relationship between executive ownership and performance changes across different 
levels of non-executive directors, board size, remuneration and short-term debt (i. e. all 
the governance variables that were found significant in model 1). That is, we test the 
"Substitute Hypothesis " proposed in section 2.2. 
In results which are not reported, we observe that board size and short-term debt do 
not have any significant impact on the relationship between executive ownership and firm 
performance. However, we find that, as the remuneration package paid to executive 
directors increases, the role of executive ownership as a governance mechanism becomes 
weaker. This result is consistent with the "Substitute Hypothesis", which suggests that the 
alternative governance mechanism or devices available to firms work as substitutes in 
mitigating agency problems. Additionally, we find that as the ratio of non-executive 
directors on the board increases, the positive relationship between executive ownership 
and performance becomes stronger. That is, non-executive directors and executive 
ownership work as complementary control mechanisms. 20 
20 However, this result does not appear to be robust in the rest of our regressions. 
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We further test the impact of remuneration and non-executive directors on the 
relationship between executive ownership and performance by interacting them not only 
with the levels term but also with the square and the cubic terms of executive ownership 
(model 3). Consistent with our expectations, the results of such a task indicate that as 
remuneration increases both the alignment effect and entrenchment effect of executive 
ownership on firm performance become weaker. The results presented in model 3, 
however, do not point to a significant interaction effect between executive ownership and 
non-executive directors. Finally, in model 4, the only interaction effect we consider is 
that between executive ownership and remuneration (the one that was found to be robust 
in model 3). Once more, the results provide strong evidence on the view that the two 
mechanisms work as substitutes in alleviating agency problems. 
Finally, for robustness purposes, in Table 2.3 we utilize splitting sample methods to 
test for the existence of the interaction effect between executive ownership and 
compensation. Specifically, we split the sample into "high-pay" firms and "low-pay" 
firms according to the following criterion: Firms with managerial compensation that lies 
above the 55'h percentile are called "high-pay" firms. On the other hand, firms with 
managerial compensation that lies below the 45 th percentile are called "low-pay" firms. 
Based on this classification, we examine whether the earlier observed non-linear 
relationship between executive ownership and Tobin's Q holds for both sub-samples. The 
results of this exercise confirm the existence of a non-linear impact of executive 
ownership for the sample of "low-pay" firms. Consistent with our expectations we do not 
observe such an impact for the group of high-pay firms (i. e. the coefficients of the level, 
square and cubic terms of executive ownership are not statistically significant). Such 
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finding further supports the existence of an interaction effects between executive 
ownership and executive remuneration. The rest of the findings of Table 2.3 are similar 
for both subgroups of firms. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the impact of the several internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and devices, including managerial ownership, short-term debt and 
managerial compensation, on corporate performance. Also, we have attempted to test 
whether these mechanisms work as substitutes or complements in mitigating agency 
related problems and, therefore, generating good performance. 
Consistent with the existing literature, our results indicate that managerial 
ownership, non-executive directors and board size have a significant impact on corporate 
performance. However, our results support the existence of two additional potential 
corporate governance mechanisms available to firms. Specifically, we find that debt 
maturity and managerial compensation are significant predictors of company 
performance. Furthermore, in favor of the substitute hypothesis mentioned earlier, our 
results reveal that managerial ownership and managerial compensation work as 
substitutes in mitigating agency problems 
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Table 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics (N=962) 
Mean Min 25% Median 75% Max- 
TOBIN'S Q 2.05 0.16 1.04 1.41 2.18 18.94 
EXOWNER 10.53 0.00 0.22 2.04 14.21 86.11 
NONEXOWNER, 4.27 0.00 0.04 0.31 2.78 86.28 
NON-EXEC (%) 49.81 12.5 40.00 50.00 60.00 85.71 
BOARDSIZE 6.95 2.00 5.00 7.00 8.00 19.00 
CONCENTR(%) 37.56 0.00 20.09 36.18 51.75 100 
REMUNERATION 15.10 0.00 1.80 5.71 15.38 29.04 
CEO-DUMMY 8.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LEVERAGE(%) 19.74 0.00 6.39 16.03 29.90 94.78 
SHORTDEBT (%) 47.77 0.00 23.09 46.66 69.67 100 
SIZE 4.21 0.08 2.64 4.09 5.48 11.64 
Notes: Ilis table shows the sample characteristics for 962 firms over the period 1999 to 2003. Analytical definitions 
for all the variables are provided in section 2.3. 
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Table 2.2 
Cross sectional re2ressions predicting corporate performance 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
Independent variables Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 0ý 
Constant 0.167 -0.201 0.304 -0.406 
(0.24) (-0.28) (0.39) (-0.57) 
EXOWNER 0.061 0.061 -0.042 0.105 
(2.31)** (2.27)** (-0.51) (3.80)*** 
EXOWNER2 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
(-2.01)** (-2.04)** (-0.11) (-3.32)*** 
EXOWNER3 2.08e-005 2.2e-005 1.46e-005 3.69e-005 
(1.81)* (1.85)* (0.50) (3.03)*** 
NONEXOWNER. 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -5.15e-005 
(0.41) (0.21) (-0.16) (-0.008) 
NON-EXEC 0.014 0.017 0.004 0.017 
(2.72)*** (3.21)*** (0.65) (3.35)*** 
BOARD SIZE -0.592 -0.654 -0.629 -0.649 
(-1.87)* (-2.05)** (-1.96)* (-2.00)** 
CONCENTR 0.0007 0.0005 -0,0002 3.86e-005 
(0.21) (0.16) (-0.07) (0.01) 
REMUN 0.296 0.603 0.747 0.752 
(8.54)*** (4.06)*** (4.84)*** (4.85)*** 
p 'EMUN2 -3.274 -2.466 -2.373 (-1.93)* (-1.36) (-1.31) 
p 'EMUN3 7.585 5.321 5.240 
(1.70)* (1.12) (1,09) 
CEODUMMY -0.234 -0.211 -0.174 -0.200 (-1.35) (-1.22) (-1.01) (4,13) 
LEVERAGE 0.225 0.296 0.239 0,225 
(0.54) (0.718) (0,61) (0.57) 
SHORT_DEBT 0.745 0.705 0.697 0.676 
(2.83)*** (2.70)*** (2.69)*** (2.63)*** 
SIZE 0.161 0.206 0.229 0.227 
(3.06)*** (3.44)*** (3.76)*** (3.78)*** 
EXOWNER*REMUN -0.033 -0.036 
(-2.46)** (-2.79)*** 
EXOWNER2*REMUN 0.001 0.001 
(2.60)*** (2.88)*** 
EXONVI, TER3*REMUN -1.25e-005 -1.32e-005 
(-2.79)*** (-3.03)*** 
EXOWNER*NON-EXEC 0.003 
(1.64) 
EXOWNERý*NON-EXEC -6e-004 (-0.91) 
EXOWNER3*NON-EXEC 3.98e-005 
(0.57) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.245 0.255 0.286 0.278 
Number of firms 962 962 962 962 
Notes: Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in section 2.3. All regressions include industry dummies. 
t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to heteroscedasticity standard errors. 
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Table 2.3 
Cross sectional regressions predicting corporate performance 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
Independent variables Panel A: High-Pay Firms Panel B: Low-Pay Ffr7ns 
(Model 5) (Model 6) 
Constant 0.170 0.272 
(0.11) (0.57) 
EXOWNER 0.030 0,096 
(0.60) (3.08)*** 
EXOWNER2 -0.0002 -0.004 
(-0.14) (-2.68)** 
EXOWNER3 -1.64e-006 3.47e-005 
(-0.11) (2.45)** 
NONEXOVvrNER 0.004 -0.001 
(0.40) (0.145) 
NON-EXEC 0.023 0.008 
(2.02)** (1.79)* 
BOARD SIZE -0.619 -0.049 
(-1.00) (-0.17) 
CONCENTR 0.005 -0.003 
(0.64) (-1.18) 
CEODUMMY -0.298 -0.147 
(-0.86) (-0.82) 
LEVERAGE 0.822 0.108 
(0.92) (0.22) 
SHORT_DEBT 0.566 0.615 
(2,11)** (2.19)** 
SIZE 0.099 0.032 
(0.92) (0.45) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
R2 0.092 0.224 
Number of firms 433 433 
Notes: Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in section 2.3. All regressions include industry 
dummies. t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to heteroscedasticity standard errors. 
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Chapter 3 
How does corporate governance interact with managerial 
00 incentives in determining leverage? 
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3.1 Introduction 
Early theoretical work on leverage noted several important factors as determinants of a 
firm's capital structure (see Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Ross, 1977; Myers, 1977; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Jensen, 1986 among others). These include the tax 
benefits of debt financing, the costs of financial distress and bankruptcy, and the costs 
associated with informational and agency problems. More recent theoretical research has 
shifted the attention to the role of managerial incentives and corporate governance in 
determining a firm's choice of leverage (see, e. g., Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1990; 
and Zwiebel, 1996). The underlying notion in this strand of the literature is that 
managers' self interest, which is reinforced by the absence of strong corporate 
governance mechanisms or devices in place, can lead firms to adopt financial policies 
that do not maximize shareholders' wealth. Managers that have enough control over the 
firm decision making process, for example, may require a low debt level so as to avoid 
the disciplinary role of debt. 
Although the empirical literature has been successful in providing supporting 
evidence for the significant role of firm characteristics such as size, growth opportunities, 
profitability, and asset tangibility in determining leverage, there has been relatively little 
empirical research conducted on how the interaction between corporate governance and 
managerial incentives affect the capital structure decision of firms. In particular, prior 
empirical literature on the subject focuses on the role of managerial incentives in 
determining corporate financial policy while ignoring how the impact of these incentives 
changes with firm-specific governance characteristics. One hypothesis, for example, is 
that managerial incentives to expropriate wealth from shareholders (e. g. by choosing a 
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leverage ratio that serves their needs but does not maximize the value of the firm) are 
weaker in firms with strong corporate governance characteristics (e. g. effective boards 
and active outside investors). The main objective of this chapter is therefore to provide 
more insights into these relations by providing a detailed examination of the role of 
internal corporate governance and managerial incentives in determining capital structure. 
The empirical analysis of this chapter is conducted in two stages. In the first stage, 
we simply investigate the direct impact of corporate governance (an index derived after 
using principal component analysiS)2 1 and managerial incentives (proxied by managerial 
ownership) on leverage. We hypothesize that in the presence of information asymmetry 
and costly agency problems better corporate governance practices facilitate the access of 
firms to external finance by reducing its cost, leading to a positive relationship between 
our proxy for corporate governance and leverage. Consistent with the alignment and 
entrenchment effects of managerial ownership (see, for example, Jensen and Meckling, 
1976 and McConnell and Servaes, 1990), we also expect a non-monotonic relationship 
between managerial ownership and leverage. The premise behind such a relationship is as 
follows: managerial ownership, when it is at low levels, helps to reduce the agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders, which may involve among other things the 
choice of a lower level of debt than what shareholders desire (alignment effect). On the 
other hand, high levels of managerial ownership strengthen managerial discretion (and 
possibly managerial entrenchment), which in turn reinforces managerial incentives to 
choose a lower than optimal leverage ratio in an attempt to escape the discipline provided 
by debt (entrenchment effect). 
21 See Section 3.4.1 for a detailed discussion on the calculation of the corporate governance index. 
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In the second stage of our empirical investigation, we test the extent to which a 
firm's financing policy is determined by the trade-off between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and managerial incentives. Corporate governance, for example, 
in addition to its direct impact, may affect leverage through influencing managerial 
incentives to adjust to (or deviate from) an optimal leverage ratio. One possible scenario 
is that the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership on leverage is less pronounced in 
well governed firms, given the limited managerial ability to exert opportunistic behaviour 
(e. g. follow a policy that is not consistent with value maximization) in such firms. Put 
differently, in the presence of strong internal corporate governance mechanisms in place 
managers may have the incentives but not the ability to follow a debt policy that is not 
consistent with value maximization. Likewise, corporate governance may also affect the 
alignment effect of managerial ownership in the sense that several corporate governance 
characteristics such as non-executive directors and ownership concentration may work as 
substitute corporate governance mechanisms or devices for managerial ownership. 
To investigate these empirical hypotheses, we use a large sample of UK listed firms 
over the period 1999-2003. First, we employ principal component analysis to create a 
corporate governance measure for each firm, which represents a score based on the 
existence of perceived good governance attributes, such as ownership concentration, 
existence of non-executive directors and board size. We then interact this measure with 
managerial incentives proxied by executive ownership. Doing so enables us to test for the 
existence of both direct and indirect effects of corporate governance on the capital 
structure decision. In terms of the estimation, we initially utilize an average cross- 
sectional approach to estimate the leverage equation (see Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
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Such an approach helps mitigate problems that may arise due to short-term fluctuations in 
the data and observed relations reflecting the effect of leverage on firm-specific 
characteristics and, also, provides results that are directly comparable with previous 
literature. To control for the effect of unobserved heterogeneity and study the capital 
structure dynamics, we also put forward a dynamic generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation. The choice of this methodology is motivated by the evidence 
reported in recent studies that firms adjust partially towards an optimal leverage ratio and 
that several unobservable factors are likely to affect such an adjustment process (see 
Ozkan, 2001). 
This chapter is similar in spirit to Friend and Lang (1988), Brailsford et al. (2002) 
and Pindado and de la Torre (2005), who analyze how the impact of managerial 
ownership on leverage changes with ownership concentration. Specifically, Friend and 
Lang (1988) show that the existence of large non-managerial investors in US 
corporations prevents managers from choosing leverage levels that serve their own 
interests. Brailsford et al. (2002) and Pindado and de la Torre (2005) also report 
significant interaction effects between managerial ownership and ownership 
concentration for a sample of Australian and Spanish firms respectively. 
Unlike previous studies that focus solely on ownership concentration, however, we 
consider a wider set of governance variables, namely ownership concentration, board size 
and board composition, which are also likely to influence the relationship between 
managerial ownership and leverage. From a methodological perspective, this study is 
distinguished from previous literature in using principal component analysis to aggregate 
individual governance mechanisms into a single factor. Our methodology helps avoid 
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problems that may arise from the potential interdependence between corporate 
governance and control variables (see, for example, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). We 
believe that our study provides important insights into at least two important related 
research questions that have not been addressed before. First, if there is a non-linear 
relation between managerial ownership and leverage, does the nature of this relation 
depend on the corporate governance environment in which firms operate? Second, if 
there are devices that may act as substitutes for leverage in monitoring and disciplining 
managers, should one still expect a significant role played by managerial ownership in 
detertnining leverage? 22 
The analysis of this chapter provides several important findings with regard to the 
relationship between managerial ownership, internal corporate governance and the firm's 
leverage decision. First, the results suggest that firms with better governance practices 
have a greater ability to issue debt financing. Second, the relationship between leverage 
and managerial ownership is non-monotonic and significant. We observe a positive 
relation at moderate levels of managerial ownership and the relationship becomes 
negative at higher levels. There is strong evidence, however, that the significant 
relationship between leverage and managerial ownership holds mainly for firms with 
poor corporate governance practices. That is, our findings suggest that managerial 
incentives explanations of leverage are more relevant for firms that do not have effective 
corporate governance mechanisms in place. Finally, consistent with the results reported 
22 The hypothesis that corporate governance mechanisms work as substitutes in mitigating agency problems 
has recently received attention by researchers (see Weir et al., 2002; Cremers and Nair, 2005 and Agca and 
Mansi, 2005 among others). The main emphasis in these studies, however, is not on how managerial 
incentives interact with corporate governance but on how internal governance (e. g. monitoring by 
institutional investors) interacts with external governance (e. g. monitoring by the market of corporate 
control) in determining corporate policy decisions and firm value. 
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in recent capital structure studies, our dynamic panel data regressions show that UK firms 
adjust partially towards a target leverage ratio. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2 we formulate 
our empirical hypotheses whereas in Section 3.3 we provide a brief description of the 
data. Section 3.4 explains how we have constructed the governance index and, also, 
presents our empirical findings. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Empirical Hypotheses 
In this section we discuss how managerial ownership, internal corporate governance and 
their interactions influence the capital structure decision of firms. Also, we briefly 
describe our expectations regarding the relationship between several firm characteristics, 
such as size, growth opportunities, asset tangibility, profitability and leverage. 
3.2.1 The role of managerial ownership 
The link between leverage and managerial incentives is often not very clear. The basic 
intuition in the leverage literature is that managers normally have incentives to keep 
borrowing at lower levels than what an optimal leverage policy would imply. There are 
several reasons as to why managers may prefer low leverage. For example, low leverage 
reduces the probability of bankruptcy and enables managers to have greater discretion 
over the use of excess cash, possibly for their own benefit. Furthermore, by having low 
debt, firms and their managers are less subject to monitoring by the capital markets (see, 
e. g., Stulz, 1990; and Hart and Moore, 1995). However, in the presence of asymmetric 
information and costly agency conflicts between managers (insiders) and outside 
investors, leverage may have a disciplining role to play and managers may be willing to 
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let leverage play this role by increasing leverage. This happens in an attempt to alleviate 
the market's managerial agency concerns. Moreover, this effect is more likely to occur in 
the presence of managerial shareholdings in the firm, as ownership generally limits the 
discretion of managers in using the firm's resources at the expense of outside investors. 
Consequently, managers may want to raise more debt as their stake in the firm increases 
leading to a positive relationship between leverage and managerial ownership (alignment 
effeCt). 23 
It is argued, however, that the relationship between leverage and managerial 
ownership is likely to be non-monotonic. As noted above, managers have incentives to 
keep borrowing at a level which is lower than optimal. Furthermore, it is more likely that 
managers will achieve the objective of low leverage at high levels of managerial 
ownership when they have much greater discretion and are possibly entrenched. Clearly, 
this would happen as long as the benefits to managers from low leverage are higher than 
the shared benefits due to the reduction in'the expected managerial agency costs. The 
above discussion implies a negative relationship between leverage and managerial 
ownership at higher levels of managerial ownership (entrenchment effect). We expect that 
one would at least observe a decrease in the positive impact of managerial ownership on 
leverage at higher levels. 
More importantly, we do not expect the non-linear relation between leverage and 
managerial ownership described above to hold in an environment in which firms have 
23 In addition to the expected agency benefits of leverage, in increasing leverage managers may also 
consider the benefits due to the reduction in the likelihood of takeover attempts. Clearly, our implicit 
assumption to derive this prediction is that the capital markets' agency concerns increase with the level of 
managerial ownership. Therefore, one could argue that the positive link between leverage and managerial 
ownership is also consistent with the strong empirical evidence that higher managerial ownership leads to 
greater firm value, in the sense that managers with greater shareholdings choose higher leverage as a self- 
disciplining device in the presence of costly and imperfect monitoring. 
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effective internal corporate governance mechanisms. There are at least two reasons we 
can provide for this prediction. First, in such an environment, there would be alternative 
governance devices acting as a substitute for leverage. In other words, there would be less 
need for leverage to play the role a corporate governance role. Second, the ability of 
managers to use their discretion would be reduced in the presence of effective internal 
corporate governance mechanisms. This is not to say that, in the presence of an effective 
internal corporate governance structure, there should be no significant relation between 
leverage and managerial ownership. For example, other things being equal, risk-averse 
managers may still prefer to have a lower leverage ratio than the firm's preferred capital 
structure. We also test for these possibilities after controlling for the relevant firm- 
specific characteristics and corporate governance factors in the empirical capital structure 
model. 
Prior empirical research on the relationship between managerial ownership and 
leverage provides us with mixed findings. A number of studies document a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and leverage (see, for example, Kim and 
Sorensen, 1986; and Mehran, 1992). The main argument in these studies is that the 
owners of managed-controlled firms prefer debt to equity in order to maintain their 
control within the firm and, also, avoid the agency costs of external equity. A competing 
argument in the literature is that debt decreases as the level of managerial ownership 
increases, reflecting the greater non-diversifiable risk of debt to management than to 
public investors (Friend and Lang, 1988). More recently, there have been a few studies 
that provide evidence for a non-linear relation between managerial ownership and 
leverage (see, for example, Brailsford et al. 2002). 
44 
3.2.2 The role of internal corporate governance 
The corporate governance environment in which firms operate has a significant impact on 
the distribution of leverage across firms. The existence of good corporate governance 
attributes, such as large shareholders and effective boards of directors, signal the firm's 
quality to its prospective lenders, who obtain a clearer view of the firm. Consequently, 
well governed firms have better reputation, easier access to capital markets and other 
sources of finance and, in general, suffer from lower agency costs of debt. This leads to a 
lower cost of external finance and relatively higher level of leverage in their capital 
structure. To put it differently, they are less likely to be under-levered, in the sense that 
they have a leverage level that is closer to the optimal. 
In addition to its direct impact, corporate governance may also exert an indirect 
impact on the capital structure decision through interactions with managerial incentives. 
That is, corporate governance may constrain or facilitate managerial incentives (as 
proxied by executive ownership) to choose a particular level of leverage. We then expect 
that the positive relationship between executive ownership and leverage (alignment 
effect) is less pronounced in well-govemed firms because executive ownership and 
corporate governance (e. g. effective boards and/or active outside investors) can 
potentially work as substitute devices in mitigating managerial agency problems. To put 
it simply, executive ownership is less important as an incentive mechanism in the case of 
firms that possess strong governance. We also expect that the negative relationship 
between executive ownership and leverage (entrenchment effect) is likely to be weaker in 
well-governed firms. That is, managers of well governed firms face more monitoring 
restrictions and, therefore, they are less able to adjust the capital structure to its own 
interests. 
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To test these hypotheses, we include our corporate governance measure, which is 
derived using principal component analysis, as well as interaction terms between this 
measure and executive ownership and its square in the leverage equation. 
3.2.3 The role of other control variables 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) we include the following control variables in the 
leverage equation we estimate. 
Tangibility: The incidence of higher agency costs associated with moral hazard is less 
dominant in firms in which a large fraction of assets is tangible (Myers, 1977). This is 
because tangible assets work as collateral in diminishing monitoring costs and, also, have 
a greater value than intangible assets in the case of bankruptcy. Therefore, firms who 
have greater proportion of tangible assets tend to have higher leverage ratios. We control 
for this effect by including the ratio of fixed assets to total assets in our empirical models. 
Growth Opportunities: Myers (1977) argues that growth opportunities affect 
significantly the amount of debt that firms issue in a negative way. In particular, high 
growth finns prefer relatively lower levels of debt in order to avoid the adverse effects of 
the underinvestment problem. Such firms should use equity, instead, to finance growth 
because such financing reduces agency costs between managers and shareholders. We 
measure growth opportunities as the ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of total assets. 
Size: Larger firms are more diversified (Titman and Wessels, 1988), have easier access 
to capital markets and borrow at better conditions (Ferri and Jones, 1979) and suffer from 
lower agency costs related to asset substitution and underinvestment (Chung, 1993 and 
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Ang et al., 1982). Consequently, such firms are expected to raise relatively higher 
leverage. We use the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for size in our analysis. 
Profitability There is no consensus regarding the relationship between debt and 
profitability. On the one hand, the pecking order theory of capital structure posits that 
firms prefer retained earnings as their main source of financing investment where their 
second preference is debt and last come new equity issues (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
According to this theory, profitable firms mainly rely on their retained earnings to finance 
investment. Therefore, a negative relationship between profitability and leverage is 
expected. On the other hand, the trade-off theory predicts that more profitable firms 
prefer debt to benefit from the tax shield, leading to a positive relationship between debt 
and profitability. We use the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of total assets to measure profitability. 
3.3 Data 
The data used in this study are obtained from two different sources. We use Datastrearn 
to collect accounting data and data on the market value of equity for the years 1999 to 
2003. In particular, we collect information on the firms' book and market leverage, asset 
tangibility, growth opportunities and profitability. Information on the firms' ownership 
structure and board structure is derived from the Hemscott Guru Academic Database. 
Specifically, we use this database to get detailed information on the level of executive 
ownership, ownership concentration and size and composition of the board for each firm. 
We compile the final sample in the following manner. We merge data provided 
from Datastream and Hemscott and exclude financial firms and utilities from the sample. 
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Then, we drop missing firm-year observations and outliers (i. e. those observations that lie 
below the I" percentile and above the 99th percentile for each variable). These criteria 
lead to a final sample of 946 firms for our empirical analysis. Table 3.1 provides the 
definitions of the variables used in the chapter whereas Table 3.2 summarizes the key 
descriptive statistics. We observe that the average book leverage for UK companies is 
17.58 per cent. The average proportion of fixed assets in the balance sheet is 29.28 per 
cent, market to book ratio is 2.22, size (logarithm of total assets) is 10.97 and profitability 
is 4.6 per cent. As far as the ownership structure and board structure variables are 
concerned, executive directors hold a significant fraction of firms' total shares, 12.88 per 
cent, whereas the average ownership concentration (i. e. the sum of stake of firm's 
shareholders with equity ownership greater than 3 per cent) reaches the level of 35.63 
per cent. Also, the average proportion of non-executive directors is 48.29 per cent and the 
average board size is 6.87 directors. In general, the descriptive statistics presented in 
Table 3.1 are in line with those reported in other studies that use UK firms in their 
analyses (see, for example, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Short and Keasey, 1999 and Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). 
Table 3.3 presents the Pearson's correlation for the variables used in the analysis. The 
results are generally in line with our expectations. The measure for book leverage is 
positively and significantly correlated with size and tangibility but negatively and 
significantly correlated with the market-to-book ratio. The observed positive correlation 
between leverage and profitability is against the pecking order theory but in line with the 
prediction of the trade-off theory. We also observe that firms with high leverage in their 
capital structure are more likely to have low levels of executive ownership, a larger board 
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size and a larger proportion of non-executive directors on the board. However, such 
findings do not lead to concrete inferences given the potential non-linear impact of 
executive ownership on leverage and the potential interdependence among the ownership 
and the board structure variables. 
3.4 Methodology and Results 
In this section we describe how we have constructed the corporate governance measure 
using principal component analysis. Then, we present the results of the univariate and the 
regression analysis. 
3.4.1 Construction of the Governance Index 
For our empirical work, we use principal component analysis to aggregate individual 
governance mechanisms into a single governance index. 24 Principal component analysis 
enables us to combine several governance variables in constructing the governance 
measure but use a single variable in the empirical models. This helps control for potential 
multicollinearity problems that may arise when one includes more than one governance 
variable in a cross-sectional regression independently (see, for example, Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996). An additional advantage of principal component analysis is that it 
automatically produces weights so that the governance measure will explain as much of 
the variance in the group of corporate governance attributes and, therefore, does not 
require the ex ante determination of the weights. Most of the earlier studies that attempt 
to establish corporate governance ranking variables count on the strong assumption that 
24 A similar approach has been used in Callahan et al. (2003) to derive an index for management 
involvement in the director nomination process and in Kayhan (2003) to derive a composite proxy for 
managerial entrenchment. 
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all the corporate governance attributes contribute equally to the corporate governance 
index (Gompers et al., 2003 and Cremers and Nair, 2005). 
We include three internal governance variables, namely ownership concentration 
(CONCENTR), board size (BOARDSIZE) and non-executive directors (NON-EXEC) as 
attributes of the corporate governance measure. We expect that ownership concentration 
has a positive weight in the index. This is based on the conjecture that shareholders with 
substantial equity stakes have more incentives than small shareholders to supervise 
management and can do so more effectively (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; and Friend and Lang, 1988). On the other hand, we expect that board size 
contributes negatively to the corporate governance measure. For example, larger boards 
are relatively less effective because coordination, communication and decision making is 
more cumbersome (Yermack, 1996). As for as the role of non-executive directors is 
concerned, it can either contribute positively or negatively to the governance index. It is 
widely acknowledged that non-executive directors contribute to better governance by 
limiting the exercise of managerial discretion within the firm (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). 
Recent evidence for UK firms, however, suggests that non-executive directors do not add 
much to the governance of firms possibly because they lack information about the firm, 
do not bring the requisite skills to the job and, hence, prefer to play a less confrontational 
role rather than a more critical monitoring role (see, for example, Franks et al., 2001 ). 25 
25 For robustness purposes, we run the principal component analysis after replacing our proxy for 
ownership concentration with the number of blockholders in each company. The inclusion of the new 
variable in the governance index is based on the view that within the group of major shareholders, 
controlling blockholders, who can be defined as those who have the capacity to determine the outcome of 
particular corporate policy decisions, are the ones with the strongest incentives to be active owners. 
Although the results are similar in both cases (e. g. the variable for controlling shareholders has a positive 
weight to the governance index) we prefer not to read too much into the new definition given the lack of a 
commonly accepted definition for controlling shareholders. Most previous studies classify controlling 
blockholders as those investors whose ownership stake exceeds the 20% level (see, for example, Faccio and 
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Table 3.4 presents the results from the principal component analysis. In Panel A we 
report the eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix of these variables. Although 
more than one eigenvalues is higher than one, indicating that more than one factor 
explain more variance than any single variable, we pick the first factor, called 
"GOVERNANCE", which accounts for the highest percentage of variation. This factor is 
a linear combination of the variables CONCENTR, NON-EXEC and BOARDSIZE and, 
given its weights, we treat this variable as an increasing function of corporate governance 
effectiveness (the underlying eigenvectors are reported in panel B). In panel C, we report 
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some descriptive statistics for the variable GOVERNANCE. 
3.4.2 Univariate analysis 
Table 3.5 presents univariate mean and standard deviation comparisons of several firm 
specific characteristics by leverage quartiles. We are interested in whether the 
characteristics of companies differ across low-levered firms (first quartile) and high- 
levered firms (fourth quartile). In general, the results support the view that firms in the 
first quartile differ significantly from firms in the fourth quartile (i. e. the t-statistic, which 
tests the hypothesis that the mean difference for each variable across the two groups of 
firms is zero, is statistically significant for almost all cases). Specifically, we find that 
firms with low leverage ratios are usually small firms, with a low proportion of tangible 
assets and relatively greater growth opportunities. We also observe that low-levered firms 
usually have smaller boards and lower proportions of non-executive directors sitting on 
Lang, 2002). However, although in most companies a 20% threshold is likely to have voting control, in 
other companies the figure is greater and in some less (Leech, 2002). 
26 For robustness purposes, we also use the summation of the first two factors as a proxy for corporate 
governance. Our results are similar in both cases. 
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them. However, the level of ownership concentration does not seem to differ significantly 
across the first and the fourth leverage quartiles. Finally, the findings of Table 3.5 show 
that low-levered firms indicate relatively higher levels of executive ownership. Such a 
finding is consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis in that managers 
become entrenched after a specific level of executive ownership, leading to a negative 
relationship between executive ownership and leverage. 
There are at least two reasons, however, why one should be cautious in interpreting 
the latter finding as anecdotal evidence for a negative relationship between executive 
ownership and leverage. Firstly, univariate analysis does not effectively control for a 
potential non-linearity in that relationship. Secondly, as already mentioned before, it is 
likely that the relationship between executive ownership and leverage may also depend 
on the corporate governance environment in which firms operate. To address these issues, 
we provide a detailed preliminary investigation on the relationship between executive 
ownership, corporate governance and leverage. Specifically, we split the sample into two 
groups by labeling the upper 45 per cent in terms of GOVERNANCE as "high- 
governance firms" and the lower 45 per cent as "low-governance firms". Then, in Table 
3.6 we examine how changes in executive ownership influence the leverage ratio for the 
two sub-samples separately. 
The results from this investigation, as piesented in Table 3.6, point to a non-linear 
relationship between executive ownership and leverage (both market leverage and book 
leverage). We first observe that, in general, leverage increases as executive ownership 
increases up to the level of about 30 per cent. However, as we move to the next deciles 
the average leverage drops significantly. Such results seem to be more pronounced for the 
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sub-group of "low-governance firms", pointing to the existence of an interaction effect 
between executive ownership and corporate governance. 27 In particular, when executive 
ownership is between 10 per cent and 20 per cent the average book leverage ratio is 15.76 
per cent (16.5 8 per cent) for high-governance (low-governance) firms. As we move to the 
next sub-group, the average value of book leverage increases to 15.93 per cent for high- 
governance firms and 20.20 per cent for low-governance firms. After that point it seems 
that the relationship between executive ownership and leverage turns to negative. For 
example, the average leverage ratio drops to the level of 10.04 per cent for high- 
governance firms and 16.63 per cent for low-governance firms when executive ownership 
lies between 40 per cent and 50 per cent. For those firms with executive ownership 
greater than 50 per cent the average leverage increases (decreases) for high-governance 
(low-governance) firms and these results hold for both book and market leverage ratios. 
However, because of small sample sizes, such an analysis can not lead to strong 
inferences regarding the relationship between executive ownership, corporate governance 
and leverage at high levels of executive ownership (e. g. greater than 30 per cent). 
3.4.3 Cross Sectional Regression Analysis 
Table 3.7 presents the empirical models where book leverage (models 1-4) and market 
leverage (model 5) are regressed on a set of firm characteristics, including the corporate 
governance measure (GOVERNANCE) and executive ownership (EXECOWNER). In an 
attempt to tackle the problem of endogeneity, we follow the approach suggested by Rajan 
27 A confusing finding here may be the fact that, when executive ownership is lower than 10 per cent, the 
average leverage ratio (both the book and market definitions) is very high for the case of low-governance 
firms. This may be explained by the fact that most of the firms that we call "low-govemance firms" are 
likely to be large firms that do not need to have strong corporate governance in place because they have a 
good reputation and a low probability of bankruptcy and, therefore, they can easily achieve high levels of 
leverage. 
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and Zingales (1995) according to which the dependent variable is measured in year t, 
while for the independent variables we use average-past values between t-1 and t-k. 
Using averages in the way we construct our explanatory variables helps mitigate potential 
problems that may arise due to short-term fluctuations and extreme values in our data. 
Also, using past values reduces problems related to reverse causality (e. g. the likelihood 
of observed relations reflecting the effects of leverage on firm specific factors). 
Specifically, in our chapter the dependent variable is measured in year 2003 whereas for 
the independent variables we use four-year average values during the period 1999 to 
2002. Industry dummies are incorporated in all cross-sectional specifications. 
We start by estimating a baseline model (model 1), which includes the firm 
characteristics suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1995). We observe that the coefficients 
of asset tangibility and firm size are positive and statistically significant. That is, on 
average, larger firms, and those firms with a greater proportion of tangible assets in their 
capital structure prefer higher leverage ratios. These results are in line with quite a few 
empirical studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al, 2001 and Gaud et al, 2005). 
Also, as expected, the estimated coefficient of the market-to-book ratio is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, which supports the view of Myers (1977) 
that high-growth firms prefer low debt so as to avoid potential agency problems related to 
underinvestment. This evidence is also in line with empirical studies by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Ozkan (200 1) and Gaud et al. (2005). 
In model 2 we include executive ownership and its square in the empirical model to 
test the hypothesis that there is a non-linear relation between leverage and managerial 
ownership. In line with our hypothesis, the results reveal that the relationship is non- 
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monotonic. In particular, when the level of executive ownership is low, an increase in 
executive ownership has the effect of aligning managers and shareholders' interests, 
leading to a relatively higher leverage ratio. However, when the level of executive 
ownership is high, the entrenchment effect sets in, resulting in a lower debt level. Our 
findings suggest a turning point of 32 per cent in that the leverage ratio of firms increases 
as executive ownership increases up to 32 per cent, and then decreases for executive 
ownership levels above 32 per cent, which is in line with what Table 3.6 suggests. 
We next investigate how the internal corporate governance structure of firms affect 
the capital structure decision (model 3). We observe a positive and significant association 
between our measure of corporate governance measure (GOVERNANCE) and leverage. 
This finding supports the view that well-gove med firms, other things being equal, face a 
lower cost of external finance and, therefore, are able to increase their debt ratios (i. e. 
direct effect of corporate governance on leverage). 
In model 4 we further extend our empirical specification by interacting our measure 
for corporate governance with the executive ownership tenns, namely EXECOWNER 
and EXECOWNER_SQ. By doing so, we test the hypothesis that corporate governance 
influences the capital structure decision by changing the incentives of managers (i. e. 
indirect effect of corporate governance). Our empirical findings support this view. The 
coefficients of both interaction terms included in model 4 are statistically significant. In 
particular, the negative coefficient of the interaction term between the corporate 
governance measure and the executive ownership indicates that, ceteris paribus, the 
alignment effect of executive ownership is less pronounced in the case of well-govemed 
firms. This gives support to the proposition that the role of leverage as a disciplining and 
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a monitoring device is reduced in well-govemed firms as the expected costs of agency 
conflicts are significantly lower in such fin-ns. That is, executive ownership plays a less 
important role as an incentive mechanism in the case of firms that already have strong 
monitoring mechanisms in place. Furthermore, we observe a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the interaction term between corporate governance and the 
square of executive ownership. Such evidence can be viewed as support for the view that, 
ceteris paribus, the entrenchment effect of executive ownership on leverage becomes 
weaker as the effectiveness of corporate governance increases. Simply put, managers in 
well-governed firms are less able to expropriate wealth by pursuing a lower level of 
leverage than what shareholders desire. We test the joint significance of both interaction 
terms included in model 4 by utilizing a Wald test. The results reject the null hypothesis 
that both interaction terms equal zero, supporting the specification of model 4. In model 5 
we use a market value definition rather than a book value definition of leverage and re- 
estimate the model . 
28 The results are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained and 
reported so far. 
3.4.4 Capital structure dynamics and robustness 
In this section we present the results from the dynamic panel data estimations. In the 
context of our analysis, a dynamic panel data framework is useful for two reasons. First, 
it helps control more successfully for the endogeneity problem that may arise due to 
unobserved heterogeneity (e. g. unobservable firm characteristics may be highly 
28 Specifically, following Berger et al. (1997) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), we measure market leverage 
as the ratio of the book value of total debt to the sum of book value of total assets and the market value of 
total equity. 
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correlated with regressors). To this end, the dynamic model complements the average 
cross sectional approach that only controls for endogeneity due to reverse causality. 
Second, it enables the study of the capital structure dynamics. A dynamic specification 
recognizes that firms may have a target leverage ratio that can not be achieved 
instantaneously. Instead, due to adjustment and other costs firms adjust partially to the 
desired leverage level (see also, Ozkan, 2001 and Miguel and Pindado, 2001). The 
empirical specification that involves the study of these issues is the following one: 
K 
Yll Q- b)Yll-l + 2: 8 Ak + n, + n, + ui, 
k=l 
where Y represents our proxy for corporate leverage and Xk is a vector of variables that 
account for firm specific characteristics, including managerial ownership, corporate 
governance as well as the interactions between managerial ownership (and its square) and 
corporate governance. The terms ni and nt represent firm-specific and time effects. 
Equation (1) contains a lagged dependent variable, Y11-1, recognizing that firms can 
not adjust instantaneously to the desired level of leverage following changes in firm- 
specific characteristics or random economic shocks. Our dynamic specification assumes 
that the adjustment depends on the parameter b, called the speed of adjustment, which 
gives the fraction of the desired change that managers can achieve. That is, Yit- Y11.1= 
b(Y*ir Y11-d, where Yi, is the actual leverage ratio at time t, while Y*it- Yit-I can be 
interpreted as the desired change in leverage. By definition, the value of b varies between 
0 (no adjustment at all towards the target) and I (immediate adjustment to the target). 
For the estimation of equation (1) we use the GMM estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) given that ordinary least squares (OLS) and within group 
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estimators (WG) are likely to yield inconsistent estimates. 29 The GMM estimator 
involves the use of instruments dated [t-2] or earlier for the lagged dependent variable 
and the endogenous regressors as well as a first difference transformation. These two 
characteristics can guarantee that the results are not driven by reverse causality or 
unobserved heterogeneity problems. The consistency of the GMM estimator, however, 
depends on the validity of instruments used, which in turn depend on the absence of 
higher order serial correlation in the idiosyncratic component of the error term. 
Therefore, in addition to the GMM results we also report the Sargan test of over- 
identifying restrictions, under the null that instruments are valid, and the two tests for 
existence of first and second order serial correlation in the first differenced residual 
(denoted as ml and m2 respectively). 
Table 3.8 presents the results from the dynamic leverage model. In all specifications 
we use instruments dated [t-2] as these instruments perform particularly well (e. g. the 
Sargan test confirms the validity of instruments whereas the ml and m2 tests confirm the 
existence of serial correlation of order one but not of order two). Consistent with the 
dynamic capital structure hypothesis, the results indicate that firms partially adjust 
towards an optimal leverage ratio, with the coefficient of adjustment being close to 0.6. 
This finding argues in favor of a relatively slow adjustment towards the target leverage 
ratio (more than 3 years). The dynamic panel data regressions also show that asset 
tangibility and size remain as two of the most important determinants of leverage (their 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant in all models). 
29 See Bond (2002) for a detailed discussion. 
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As far as the impact of managerial incentives and internal corporate governance on 
firm's financing policy are concerned, our results confirm our earlier findings that both 
variables are statistically significant in the leverage equation. Specifically, there is 
supporting evidence for both the alignment and entrenchment effects of managerial 
ownership whereas our corporate governance index enters the equation with a positive 
sign. In addition, the GMM estimations indicate that corporate governance also affects 
the leverage decision indirectly. Specifically, it seems that the alignment effect of 
managerial ownership is less pronounced in firms that operate under a strong corporate 
governance environment (i. e. the governance index is relatively high) (see model 9). 
However, in contrast to the cross sectional results, the dynamic analysis does not show 
that the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership also varies with corporate 
governance (the coefficient of the interaction term between the square of managerial 
ownership and corporate governance is statistically insignificant in model 10). These 
results hold under both definitions of leverage. 
In summary, the results from the dynamic panel data regressions support our earlier 
findings that corporate governance and managerial incentives are both important in 
shaping the capital structure decision of firms. It also seems that the impact of managerial 
incentives on leverage (in particular the alignment effect of managerial ownership) varies 
with the effectiveness of the corporate governance environment in which firms operate. 
Finally, consistent with recent studies on the subject (see, for example, Ozkan, 2001 and 
Miguel and Pindado, 2001), our GMM results confirm the dynamic nature of the capital 
structure decision of firms. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, using a large sample of 946 UK listed firms, we have provided an 
empirical analysis of the relation between leverage, corporate governance and managerial 
incentives. We employ principal component analysis to construct a corporate governance 
measure, which represents a score based on the existence of perceived good governance 
attributes, such as ownership concentration, non-executive directors and board size. The 
econometric specification used in this study allows the test of the hypothesis that internal 
governance influences leverage both directly, through reducing the expected agency costs 
of debt, and indirectly, through influencing managerial incentives to adjust to (or deviate 
from) and optimal leverage ratio. It also allows studying the hypothesis that firms, due to 
adjustment and other costs, adjust only partially towards an optimal leverage ratio. 
Our empirical findings strongly suggest that the quality of internal corporate 
governance structure matters to the leverage decision. In particular, firms that posses 
strong corporate governance suffer from lower agency costs of debt, leading to a higher 
leverage ratio. Also, managerial incentives play a significant role in determining leverage 
and the relation between leverage and managerial ownership, which is a proxy for 
managerial incentives, is non-monotonic. Most importantly, we present evidence 
supporting the view that what determines the leverage decision of firms is not only 
internal corporate governance and managerial incentives per se, but also the interaction 
between the two. Put differently, we conjecture that although managers may have 
incentives to choose specific capital structures, these incentives themselves are 
influenced by the corporate governance environment in which fin-ns operate. 
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Table 3.1: Variables, Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent Variables 
LEVERAGE(BOOK) The ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of Datastream 
total assets (%) 
LEVERAGE(MKT) The book value of total debt to the sum of the book value of 
total assets and the market value of total equity (1/o) 
Independent Variables 
TANGIBILITY The ratio of total Exed assets to the book value of total assets 
N 
MKTBOOK The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value 
of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of 
assets. 
SIZE Total assets (in logarithm) 
PROFITABILITY The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of total assets. 
EXECOWNER The percentage of equity ownership held by executive 
directors 
CONCENTR. The sum of the stakes of firm's shareholders (other than 
managers) with equity ownership greater than 3 per cent (%) 
NON-EXEC. The ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the 
number of total directors on the board (%) 
BOARD SIZE The total number of directors on the board 
Datastream 
Datastream 
Datastream 
Datastream 
Datastream 
Hemscott 
Hemscott 
Ilemscott 
Hemscott 
Notes: This Table provides the definitions of the main variables used in our analysis as well as some information on our 
data sources. Datastream database provides accounting and market data. Hemscott Guru Academic database provides 
financial data for the UK's top 300,000 companies and detailed data on all directors of UK listed companies. 
Table 3.2: Descrii3tive Statistics (N=946 
Mean St. Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
LEVERAGE(BOOK) 17.58 16.72 0 2.20 14.43 27.89 87.78 
LEVERAGE(MKT) 13.37 14.62 0 1.32 9.58 20.14 92.11 
TANGIBILITY 29.28 24.59 0 9.14 21.30 44.33 98.69 
MKTBOOK 2.217 2.103 0.221 1.066 1.506 2.463 18.36 
SIZE 10.97 2.176 6.171 9.342 10.71 12.25 18.62 
PROFITABILITY 0.046 0.182 -0.892 0 0.086 0.151 0.601 
EXECO)NNER 12.88 17.63 0 0.347 4.410 18.94 88.38 
CONCENTR 35.63 20.15 0 20.27 34.14 48.96 95.19 
NON-EXEC 48.29 13.69 0 39.29 48.59 57.14 100 
BOARDSIZE 6.870 2.209 2 5.25 6.5 8 21 
Notes: This Table provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. The means of the variables 
(except for the leverage variables, which are measured in 2003) are measured over the period 1999-2002. Definitions for all 
the variables are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.4: Results from Common Factor Analysis 
Panel A nvalues of the reduced correlation matrix 
23 
1.163 1.152 0.685 
. 
Panel B: Index Weight 
CONCENTR NON-EXEC BOARDSIZE 
0.263 -0.545 -0.796 
Panel C. - Descriptive statisticsfor thefirstfactor extracted (called GOVERNANCE) 
Mean Min Median Max 
4.9e-18 -5.834 0.112 3,163 
Notes: Definitions for the variables CONCENTFý NON-EXEC and BOARDSIZE are provided in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.5: Firm Characteristics by Leverage Quartiles 
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 West 
TANGIBILITY 18.39 25.31 30.67 42.74 -3.65*** 
18.56 25.94 31.33 41.25 -10.15*** 
[19.62] [21.60] [21.28] [28.31] 
MKTBOOK 2.994 2.271 1.806 1.795 5.67*** 
3.002 2.241 1.859 1,742 . 5.98*** [3.036] [2.109] [1.314] [1.176) 
SIZE 9.740 10.64 11.54 11.97 -12.55*** 
9.710 10.65 11.53 12.00 -12.95*** 
[1.562] [2.020] [2.1061 [2.252] 
PROFITABILITY -0.026 0.032 0.093 0.086 -6.36*** 
-0.028 0.039 0.089 0.082 -6.29*** 
[0.2371 [0.199] [0.1051 [0.128] 
EXECOWNER 15.88 14.87 11.00 9.78 3.96*** 
15.69 15.03 11.17 9.49 4.07*** 
[18.56] [19.23] [17.03] [14.76] 
CONCENTR 37.31 36.13 34.16 34.90 1.25 
37.64 36.09 33.07 35.76 0.97 
[21.08] [19.75] [18.80] [20.86] 
NON-EXEC 47.13 47.36 48.80 49.85 -2.16** 
47.21 47.43 48.59 49.82 -2.10** [14.75] [13.71] [13.56] [12.671 
BOARDSIZE 6.172 6.613 7.243 7.453 -6.98*** 6.191 6.618 7.211 7.469 -7.46*** [1.6391 [2.192] [2.400] [2.3011 
GOVERNANCE 0.320 0.136 -0.174 -0.282 6.45*** 0.301 0.1.54 -0.166 -0.261 6.01*** [0.8461 [1.0491 [1.1271 [1.163] 
Notes: This Table provides univariate mean comparisons of several firm specific characteristics by book leverage 
quartiles (normal format) and market leverage quartiles (italic format). It also provides standard deviation 
comparisons by book leverage quartiles (bracketed). The I-statistic is for a difference of means from the first to the fourth quartiles. Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 3.1. ***and ** indicate that the difference in 
means is statistically significant at the I% and 5% levels respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Leverage by Executive Ownership and Corporate Governance Effectiveness 
Book Leveraze 
High-Governance Low-Governance 
Firms Firms 
Market Leverne 
High-Governance Loi4-Govemance 
Finns Finns 
1. EXECOWNER<10% 15.73 20.66 11.71 15.80 
2. 10%< EXECOWNER<20% 15.76 16.58 13.37 11.02 
3. 20%< EXECOWNER<30% 15.93 20.20 13.88 16.12 
4. 30%< EXECOWNER<40% 14.86 19.23 9.25 13.93 
5. 40%< EXECOWNER<50% 10.04 16.63 6.75 9.2 
6. EXECOWNER>50% 13.53 7.20 10.10 5.27 
Notes: This Table examines how leverage varies with changes in executive ownership and corporate governance. We split the 
sample into two groups by labeling the upper 45 per cent in terms of GOVERNANCE as "High-Governance Firms" and the 
lower 45 per cent as "Low-Governance Finns". Analytical definitions for the variables EXECOWNER and GOVERNANCE 
are defined in Table 3.1. nc number of high-governance firms in groups 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 is 196,78,45,42,23 and 42 
respectively. The number of low-govemance firms in groups 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 is 345,33,15,12,10 and II respectively. 
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Table 3.7: Cross Sectional Regressions Predicting Leverage 
Dependent Variable: Models 1-4: LEVERAGE (BOOK), Model 5: LEVERAGE (MKT, 
Independent Variables 
Model Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant -0.062 -0.095 -0.147 -0.151 -0.140 
(-1.35) (-1.99)** (-2.5 1)** (-2.57)*** (-3.17)*** 
TANGIBILITY 0.172 0.174 0.172 0.171 0.107 
(6.72)*** (6.94)*** (6.95)*** (6.89)*** (5.40)*** 
MKTBOOK -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(-1.97)** (-2.14)** (-1.71)* (. 1.73)* (-1.80)* 
SIZE 0.020 0,021 0.026 0.026 0.022 
(7.59)*** (7.59)*** (6.59)*** (6.72)*** (6.75)*** 
PROFITABILITY 0.039 0.035 0.029 0.030 -0.003 
(1.43) (1.27) (1.03) (1.10) (-0.10) 
EXECOWNER. 0.173 0.171 0.238 0.158 
(2.22)** (2.21)** (2.86)*** (2,02)** 
EXECOWNER-SQ -0.278 -0.281 -0.417 -0.322 
(-2.37)** (-2.42)** (-3.00)*** (-2,55)** 
GOVERNANCE 0.011 0.015 0.014 
(1.75)* (2.07)** (2.31)*** 
GOVERNANCE* -0.121 -0.096 EXECOWNER (-1.82)* (-1.74)* 
GOVERNANCE* 0.212 0.171 
EXECOWNER-SQ (2.18)** (2.20)** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.236 0.239 0.242 0,245 0.189 
Number of firms 946 946 946 946 946 
Notes: 'Ibis Table provides the results from our cross sectional regressions predicting leverage. In models I to 4 the 
dependent variable is the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets. In model 5 the dependent variable is the 
book value of total debt to the sum of the book value of total assets and the market value of total equity. The independent 
variables, except for GOVERNANCE, are defined in Table 3.1. GOVERNANCE is an index variable that evaluates the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance system in which firms operate and is derived after using Principal Component 
Analysis (see Section 3.4.1 for details). All regressions include industry dummies. t-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. For the estimation we used consistent to heteroscedasticity standard errors. and * indicate coefficient is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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Table 3.8: Dynamic Panel Data Results (GNIM) 
DcDcndent Variable: Models 6-10: LEVERAGE (BOOK), Model 11: LEVERAGE (MKT) 
Independent Variables 
Model Model Model 
(6) (7) (8) 
Model 
(9) 
Model 
(10) 
Model 
(11) 
Constant 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
(0.34) (0.83) (0.86) (0.827) (0.61) (0.80) 
LEVERAGEI-1 0.444 0.426 0.410 0.413 0.401 0.554 
(6.72)*** (6.09)*** (6.06)*** (6.37)*** (6.14)*** (6.53)*** 
TANGIBILITY 0.484 0.502 0.553 0.496 0.469 0.385 
(2.25)** (2.07)** (2.26)** (2.29)** (2.19)** (1.95)* 
MKTBOOK -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 
(-1.05) (-1.33) (-1.47) (-1.76)* (-2.15)** (-1.35) 
SIZE 0.097 0.090 0.096 0.081 0.086 0.068 
(2.77)*** (2.51)** (2.75)*** (2.37)** (2.73)*** (2.62)*** 
PROFITABILITY 0.023 -0.005 0.004 0.021 0.013 0.008 
(0.42) (-0.11) (0.08) (0.55) (0.37) (0.24) 
EXECOWNER 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 
(2.750*** (2.70)*** (2.39)** (2.16)** (2.27)** 
EXECOWNER-SQ -8.5e-005 -8.5e-005 -6.3e-005 4.6e-005 -6.1 e-005 
(-2.55)*** (-2.56)*** (-1.83)* (-1.25) (-2.22)** 
GOVERNANCE 0.031 0.044 0.034 0.039 
(1.90)* (2.59)*** (1.83)* (2.85)*** 
GOVERNANCE* -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
EXECOWNER (-2.08)** (0.32) (-1.91)* 
GOVERNANCE* -3.8e-005 
EXECOWNER-SQ (496) 
Observations 2496 2496 2496 2496 2496 2496 
Wald (joint) 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0,00* 0.00* 
Sargan 0.14 0.56 0.27 0.62 0.63 0.34 
ml test 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
m2 test 0.90 0.97 0.92 0.85 0.92 0.80 
Notes: This Table reports the results from the GMM (in first differences) estimator. In models 6 to 10 the dependent 
variable is the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets. In model II the dependent variable is the book value of 
total debt to the sum of the book value of total assets and the market value of total equity. The independent variables, except for 
GOVERNANCE, are defined in Table 3.1. GOVERNANCE is an index variable that evaluates the effectiveness of the 
corporate governance system in which firms operate and is derived using Principal Component Analysis (see Section 3.4.1 for 
details). For the estimation, levels dated [t-2] were used as instruments. Time dummies were used in all specifications. 
For the estimation we used asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. We report a Wald test which 
evaluates the join significance of all regressors in each model. We also report the Sargan test, which is a test of over- 
identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a x2 under the null of valid instruments. in I and m2 are tests for the 
absence of first order and second order correlation in the residuals. These test statistics are asymptotically distributed as 
N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. * indicates that test statistic rejects the null hypothesis. 
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Chapter 4 
Agency Costs and Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
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4.1 Introduction 
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency relations within the firrn and costs 
associated with them have been extensively investigated in the corporate finance literature. 
There is a great deal of empirical work providing evidence that financial decisions, 
investment decisions and, hence, firm value are significantly affected by the presence of 
agency conflicts and the extent of agency costs. The focus of these studies has been the 
impact of the expected agency costs on the performance of firms. 30 Moreover, the implicit 
assumption is that, in imperfect capital markets, agency costs arising from conflicts 
between firms' claimholders exist and the value of a firm decreases if the market expects 
that these costs are likely to be realised. It is also assumed that there are internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms that can help reduce the magnitude of these 
costs and their negative impact on firm value. For example, much of the previous work on 
the ownership-performance relationship relies on the view that managerial ownership can 
align the interests of managers and shareholders and hence one is likely to observe a 
positive impact exerted by managerial shareholdings on the performance of firms. The 
positive impact is argued to be due to the decrease in the expected costs of the agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders. 
Despite many valuable insights provided by this strand of the literature, however, 
only very few studies directly tackle the measurement issue of the principal variable of 
interest, namely agency costs. Notable exceptions are Ang et al. (2000), Singh and 
Davidson (2003) and Fleming et al. (2005), who investigate the empirical determinants of 
agency costs and focus on the role of debt and ownership structure in mitigating agency 
30 See, for example, Morck et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
among others. 
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problems. In doing so, they use two alternative proxies for agency costs: the ratio of total 
sales to total assets (asset turnover) and the ratio of selling, general and administrative 
expenses to total sales (SG&A). In line with the findings of previous research, they provide 
evidence that managerial ownership aligns the interests of managers and shareholders and, 
hence, reduces agency costs. However, there is no consensus among the studies regarding 
the role of debt in mitigating such problems and associated costs. Ang et al. (2000) point 
out that debt has an alleviating role, whereas for Singh and Davidson (2003) it has an 
aggravating one. Additionally, existing studies do not provide sufficient evidence on the 
impact of other governance mechanisms, such as managerial compensation and debt 
maturity, and growth opportunities on agency costs. 
The objective of this chapter is to extend the investigation of these studies by 
analysing empirically the determinants of agency costs in the UK for a large sample of 
listed firms. Following the works of Ang et al. (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003) and 
Fleming et al. (2005) we model both proxies of agency costs: asset turnover and the SG&A 
ratio. More specifically, we empirically examine the impact of capital structure, ownership, 
board composition and managerial compensation on the costs that are likely to arise from 
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agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. In doing so, we also pay particular 
attention to the role of growth opportunities in influencing the effectiveness of internal 
governance mechanisms in reducing agency costs. 
In carrying out the analysis in this chapter, we aim to provide insights in at least three 
important areas of the empirical research on agency costs. First, in investigating the 
31 As explained later in the paper, the two proxies for agency costs that are used in our analysis are more 
likely to capture agency problems between managers and shareholders. However, we do not rule out the 
possibility that they may also capture, to some extent, agency problems between shareholders and 
debtholders. 
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determinants of agency costs, the analysis of this chapter incorporates important firm- 
specific characteristics (internal corporate governance devices) that possibly affect agency 
costs but were ignored by previous studies. In particular, we explore the role of debt 
maturity structure in controlling agency costs. It is widely acknowledged that short-term 
debt may be more effective than long-term debt in reducing the expected costs of the 
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underinvestment problem of Myers (1977). Accordingly, in our analysis, we consider the 
maturity structure of debt as a potential governance device that is effective in reducing the 
expected costs of the agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders. Similar to Ang 
et al. (2000), who investigate whether bank debt creates a positive externality in the form of 
lower agency costs, we also check if the source of debt financing matters in mitigating 
agency problems. 
Another potentially effective corporate governance mechanism we consider relates to 
managerial compensation. Recent studies suggest that compensation contracts can motivate 
managers to take actions that maximize shareholders' wealth (see, e. g., Core et al., 2003; 
Murphy, 1999 among others). This is based on the view that financial "carrots" motivate 
managers to maximize firm value. To put it differently, a manager that receives an 
attractive compensation package will presumably be less likely, ceteris paribus, to exert 
insufficient effort and risk the loss of his job. In this chapter, we examine the effectiveness 
of managerial compensation as a corporate governance mechanism by including the salary 
of managers in our empirical agency model. We also acknowledge that there have been 
concerns about excessive compensation packages and their negative impact on corporate 
32 It is argued that firms with greater growth opportunities should have more short-term debt because 
shortening debt maturity would make it more likely that debt will mature before any opportunity to exercise 
the growth options. Consistent with this prediction, there are several empirical debt maturity studies that find 
a negative relation between maturity and growth opportunities (see, e. g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes 
and Opler, 1996; and Ozkan, 2000 among others). 
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performance (see, for example, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Accordingly, we investigate the 
possibility of a non-monotonic impact the managerial compensation may exert on agency 
costs. 
Second, our empirical model captures potential interactions between corporate 
governance mechanisms and growth opportunities. We expect the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms in reducing agency problems to be dependent on a firm's growth 
opportunities. In particular, if agency problems are associated with greater infortnation 
asymmetry (a common problem in high-growth firms), the corporate governance 
mechanisms that are likely to mitigate such problems are expected to be more effective for 
high-growth firms (see, e. g., Smith and Watts, 1992 and Gaver and Gaver, 1993). However, 
if agency problems are associated with conflicts over the use of free cash flow (a common 
problem in low-growth firms), the corporate governance mechanisms that are likely to 
mitigate such problems are expected to be more effective for low-growth firms (see, e. g., 
Jensen, 1986). 
Our results strongly support our empirical hypotheses. Debt maturity and managerial 
compensation seem to play an important role in mitigating agency related problems for UK 
firms. Additionally, there is strong evidence that specific governance mechanisms are not 
homogeneous but vary with growth opportunities. For instance, we find that the alignment 
effect of executive ownership is more pronounced in high-growth firms. This finding 
complements earlier research by Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993) and 
Lasfer (2002) showing that high-growth firms are likely to prefer incentive mechanisms 
(e. g. managerial ownership) whereas low-growth firms focus mainly on monitoring 
mechanisms (e. g. short-term debt) for mitigating agency problems. Finally, consistent with 
71 
the findings provided by Ang et al. (2000) and Singh and Davidson (2003) for the US firms 
and Fleming et al. (2005) for Australian firms, we present evidence that managerial 
ownership, ownership concentration and, to some extent, bank debt can also work as 
potential corporate governance mechanisms or devices for UK firms. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 we discuss the 
related theory and formulate our empirical hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the way in 
which we have constructed our sample and presents several descriptive statistics about it. 
Finally, Section 4.4 presents the empirical results and section 4.5 concludes 
4.2 Agency Costs, Corporate Governance and Growth Options 
It has been argued that managerial ownership, when it is at low levels, can help align the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) (alignment 
effect). After some level of managerial ownership, though, managers exert insufficient 
effort, collect private benefits and entrench themselves at the expense of other investors 
(see, for example, McConnell and Servaes, 1990) (entrenchment effect). Finally, several 
studies suggest that at high levels of managerial ownership there is a resurgence of 
entrenchment behaviour (Morck et al., 1988; Short and Keasey, 1999). 
However, in addition to managerial ownership, there are several aspects of firm's 
ownership, board, capital and compensation structure that can also work as effective 
governance mechanisms or devices. For example, corporate governance research 
recognizes the essential role performed by the board of directors in monitoring management 
(see, for example, Fama and Jensen, 1983 among others). Several studies, though, argue 
that such an effect is expected to relatively weak for the case of UK market (see, for 
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example, Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998) and Lasfer, 2002)33. In addition to the board of 
directors, one increasingly important issue concerns the role of ownership concentration in 
exerting proper management supervision and preventing managerial entrenchment (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). In the context of the UK market, the existing takeover code and the 
favourable law to the minority shareholders creates obstacles to building controlling stakes 
and, therefore, ownership concentration may not affect firm performance significantly. 34 
Furthermore, managerial compensation can also work as an important mechanism that 
influences managers to take actions that maximize the value of the firm (see Core et al., 
2001 and Murphy, 1999). For example, a manager that receives an attractive compensation 
package will presumably be less likely, ceteris paribus, to exert insufficient effort and risk 
the loss of his job. However, the relationship between managerial compensation and agency 
costs is not necessarily linear. There is a strand of literature that considers executive 
compensation as a part of the agency problems rather than a solution of it. 35 Finally, several 
studies suggest that debt incorporates significant monitoring, signalling and renegotiation 
characteristics that can mitigate agency conflicts between managers and outside investors 
(see, for example, Diamond, 1991; Ross'. 1977). Such effects are particularly true for the 
case of short-term debt (Myers, 1977; Flannery, 1986). 36 
33 For example, it is argued that UK corporate boards usually play a less confrontational role rather than a 
more critical monitoring one 
34 Specifically, ownership in the UK is very dispersed and relatively large portfolios are kept only by 
institutional investors. However, in contrast to managers, which are regarded as being strong, UK institutions 
are usually characterized as being passive investors and insufficient monitors within a firm (Goergen and 
Rennebog, 2001). 
35 See Chapter I for an analytical discussion on this issue. 
36 An analytical discussion on the impact of these mechanisms on corporate strategy and value is provided in 
Chapter 1. Similar to the case of corporate performance, we carry out a preliminary investigation to get an 
idea about the nature of the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and our proxies for agency 
costs. Two mechanisms were found to be associated with agency costs in a non-linear way, namely 
managerial ownership and salary (see graphs 4.1 and 4.2). Accordingly, we incorporate higher order 
polynomials in our empirical specification to capture such non-linearities (see Section 4.4.2). 
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In addition to the direct impact of these mechanisms on agency costs, it is likely 
however that the various governance mechanisms interact in complicated ways with other 
aspects of the firms (e. g. growth opportunities). The reasoning is as follows. The magnitude 
of agency costs related to underinvestment, asset substitution and free-cash-flow is 
expected to differ significantly across high growth and low growth firms. In the 
underinvestment problem, managers may decide to pass up positive net present value 
projects since the benefits would mainly accrue to debt-holders. Such a problem is 
generally more severe in firms with attractive growth options (Myers, 1977). Asset 
substitution problems, which occur when managers opportunistically substitute higher 
variance assets for low variance assets, are also more prevalent in high-growth firms due to 
high asymmetric information between investors and borrowers (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). High growth firms, on the other hand, face lower free cash-low problems, which 
mainly occur in firms that have substantial cash reserves and tend to undertake risky 
investment projects (Jensen, 1986). 
Given the different magnitude and types of agency costs between high-growth and 
low-growth firms, we expect the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms to vary 
with growth opportunities. In particular, if agency problems are associated with greater 
underinvestment or information asymmetry (a common problem in high-growth firms), we 
expect corporate governance mechanisms that mitigate such problems to be more effective 
in high-growth firms (Smith and Watts, 1992 and Gaver and Gaver, 1993). However, if 
agency problems are associated with conflicts over the use of free-cash-flow (a common 
problem in low-growth firms), we expect governance mechanisms that mitigate such 
problems to play a more important role in low-growth firms (Jensen, 1986). 
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Several empirical studies that model corporate performance test for the existence of 
interactions between internal governance mechanisms and growth opportunities. For 
example, McConnell and Servaes (1995) find that the relationship between firm value and 
leverage is negative for high-growth firms and positive for low-growth firms. Also, they 
provide weak evidence that the allocation of equity ownership between corporate insiders 
and other types of investors is more important for low-growth firms. In a similar spirit, 
Lasfer (2002) points out that high-growth firm (low-growth firms) rely more on managerial 
ownership (board structure) to mitigate agency problems. Finally, Chen (2003) finds that 
the positive relationship between annual stock bonus and equity value is stronger for firms 
with greater growth opportunities. 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data sources 
For our empirical analysis of agency costs we use a large sample of publicly traded UK 
firms over the period 1999-2003. We use two data sources for the compilation of our 
sample. Accounting data and data on the market value of equity are collected from 
Datastream. Specifically, we use Datastream to collect information on firm size, market 
value of equity, annual sales, selling general and administrative expenses, level of bank 
debt, short-term debt and total debt. 
Information on firm's ownership, board and managerial compensation structure is 
derived from the Hemscott Guru Academic database. This database provides financial data 
for the UK's top 300,000 companies, detailed data on all directors of UK listed companies, 
live regulatory and AFX News feeds and share price charts and trades. In specific, we use 
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the Hemscott Guru Academic to get detailed information on the level of managerial 
ownership, ownership concentration, size and, composition of the board, and managerial 
cash compensation. 
The way in which our final sample is compiled is the following: we start with a total 
of 1672 UK listed firms derived from Datastream. This number is reduced to 1450 firms 
after excluding financial firms from the sample. After matching Datastrearn data with the 
data provided by Hemscott Guru Academic, the number of firms further decreases to 1150. 
Missing firm-year observations for any variable in the model during the sample period are 
also dropped. Finally, we restrict our analysis to values for each variable that lie between 
the I" and the 99'h percentile to avoid the problem with extreme values. This criterion left 
us with 897 firms for the current analysis. 
4.3.2 Dependent Variable 
In this study we use two alternative proxies for agency costs. Firstly, we use the ratio of 
annual sales to total assets (Asset Turnover) as an inverse proxy for agency costs. This ratio 
can be interpreted as an asset utilization ratio that shows how effectively management 
deploys the firm's assets. A low asset turnover ratio may indicate poor investment 
decisions, insufficient effort, consumption of perquisites and purchase of unproductive 
products (e. g. office space). Firms with low asset turnover ratios are expected to experience 
high agency costs between managers and shareholders. 37 A similar proxy for agency costs 
37 The asset turnover ratio may also capture (to some extent) agency costs of debt. For instance, the sales ratio 
provides a good signal for the lender about how effectively the borrower (firm) employs its assets and, 
therefore, affects the cost of capital. 
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is also used in the studies of Ang et al. (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003) and Fleming et 
38 
al. (2005). 
Secondly, following Singh and Davidson (2003), we use the ratio of selling, general 
and administrative expenses to sales (SG&A) as a direct proxy for agency costs. The idea 
here is that SG&A expenses include, among others, commissions charged by agents to 
facilitate transactions, travel expenses for executives, advertising and marketing costs, rents 
and other utilities and, therefore, the SG&A ratio is likely to reflect, to some extent, 
managerial discretion in spending company resources. Consistent with this view, Singh and 
Davidson (2003) point out that management usually use advertising and selling expenses to 
camouflage expenditures on perquisites. 39 
4.3.3 Independent Variables 
Our empirical model includes a set of corporate governance variables related to firm's 
ownership, board, compensation and capital structure as predictors of agency costs (see 
section 4.2). Several control variables are also incorporated. Specifically, we use the 
logarithm of total assets in 1999 prices as a proxy for firm size (SIZE). Also, we include the 
market-to-book value (MKTBOOK) as a proxy for growth opportunities . 
40 Finally, we 
divide firms into 15 sectors and include 14 dummy variables accordingly to control for 
sector specific effects. Analytical definitions for all the variables are given in Table 4.1. 
38 However, Ang et al. (2000) and Fleming et al. (2005), instead of using the ratio directly, consider asset 
turnover differences with respect to a zero agency cost benchmark. 
39 An alternative proxy for agency costs between managers and shareholders, which is not used in our paper 
though, is the interaction of company's growth opportunities with its free cash flow (see Doukas et al., 2002). 40 For robustness purposes, we later substitute MKTBOOK with another proxy for growth opportunities, 
which is derived after using principal component analysis (see Section 4.2 for details). 
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A 
4.3.4 Methodology 
We examine the determinants of agency costs by utilizing the cross sectional average 
methodology proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1995). In particular, the dependent variable 
is measured at some time t, while for the independent variables we use average-past values. 
Specifically, the dependent variable is measured in year 2003 and independent variables are 
measured over the period 1999-2002. Using averages in the way we construct our 
explanatory variables helps mitigate potential problems that may arise due to short-term 
fluctuations and extreme values in our data. Also, using past values reduces the likelihood 
of observed relations reflecting the effects of asset turnover on firm specific factors. 
To explore the hypothesis that the nature of the relationship between internal 
governance mechanisms and agency costs differs across high growth and low growth firms, 
we interact our proxy for growth opportunities with the alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms. In this way, we test for the existence of both main effects (the impact of 
governance variables on agency costs) and conditional effects (the impact of growth 
opportunities on the relationship between governance variables and agency costs). 
4.3.5 Sample Characteristics 
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. The average 
values of asset turnover ratio and SG&A ratio are 1.24 and 0.45 respectively. The average 
value for managerial ownership is 14.74 per cent, of which the average proportion of stakes 
held by executive (non-executive) directors is 10.68 per cent (4.06 per cent). Ownership 
concentration reaches the level of 37.19 per cent, on average, in our sample. Also, the 
average proportion of non-executive directors is 49.5 per cent and the average board size is 
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6.97 directors. Finally, we were able to identify only 73 firms out of the final 897 (8.1 per 
cent) in which the positions of CEO and COB are not separated. As far as the capital 
structure variables are concerned, the average proportion of bank debt on firm's capital 
structure is 55.65 per cent and that of short-term debt is 49.53 per cent. Finally, the average 
market-to-book value is 2.09. In general, the descriptive statistics are in line with those 
reported in other studies for UK firms (see, for example, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Lasfer, 
2002 and Short and Keasey, 1999). 
Table 4.3 presents the Pearson's Correlation among the variables. Our inverse proxy 
for agency costs, asset turnover, is positively and significantly correlated with managerial 
ownership, executive ownership, salary, bank debt and short-term debt. Ownership 
concentration is also positively related to asset turnover but the correlation coefficient is not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, board size and non-executive directors are found 
to be negatively correlated with asset turnover. Finally, as expected, asset turnover is 
negatively correlated with both growth opportunities and firm size. The results for our 
second proxy for agency costs, SG&A, are qualitatively similar with a few exceptions (e. g. 
short-term debt) but with opposite signs. This is explained by the fact that SG&A is a direct 
and not an inverse proxy for agency costs. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4.4 reports univariate mean-comparison test results of the sample firm subgroups 
categorized on the basis of above and below median values for managerial ownership, 
ownership concentration, proportion of non-executives, board size, salary, bank debt, short- 
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term debt, total debt, firm size and growth opportunities. In Panel A of Table 4.4 we use 
asset turnover as an inverse proxy for agency costs. It seems that firrns with above median 
managerial ownership (ownership concentration) have asset turnover of 1.34 (1.31) 
whereas those with below median managerial ownership (ownership concentration) have 
asset turnover of 1.15 (1.17). These differences are statistically significant at the I per cent 
(5 per cent) level. That is, firms with high levels of managerial ownership and ownership 
concentration have higher asset turnover ratios, ceteris paribus. The results also indicate 
that firms with above median values for salary, bank debt and short-term debt have also 
higher asset turnover ratios. On the other hand, our univariate analysis reveals that firms 
with larger board sizes display significantly lower sales to asset ratios. 
In panel B of Table 4.4 we report the univariate results after using the SO&A ratio as 
a proxy for agency costs. We find that firms with above median ownership concentration 
(MKTBOOK) have an SG&A expense ratio of 0.41 (0.55) whereas firms with below 
median ownership concentration (MKTBOOK) have an SG&A ratio of 0.49 (0.36). The 
rest of results presented in panel B are either insignificant or against our expectations. 41 
Overall, the univariate analysis provides some evidence for the view that several corporate 
governance mechanisms or devices, such as managerial ownership, ownership 
concentration, salary, bank debt and short-term debt can help mitigate agency problems 
between managers and shareholders. Also, consistent with previous studies, we find that the 
relation between governance variables and agency costs is stronger for the asset turnover 
ratio than the SG&A ratio. The analysis that follows allows us to test the validity of these 
results in a multivariate framework. 
41 Singh and Davidson (2003) obtains a set of similar results for the case when agency costs are approximated 
with the SG&A ratio. 
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4.4.2 Multivarlate Analysis 
In this section we present the results from the cross sectional regression analysis. We start 
with a linear specification model, where asset turnover (our inverse proxy for agency costs) 
is regressed against a set of explanatory variables (see model I of Table 4.5). Our main 
objective here is to extend the empirical specification of prior agency models by including 
short-term debt and managerial salary as additional determinants of agency costs. The 
inclusion of these variables helps investigate the extent to which debt maturity and cash 
compensation can work as effective corporate governance mechanisms or devices for UK 
firms. In this model we also control for the impact of several other variables, such as 
ownership structure, board structure firm size and market to book ratio, on our proxy for 
agency costs. The empirical results support our expectations regarding the potential 
corporate governance role played by debt maturity and managerial salary. In particular, 
there is evidence that both short-term debt and salary are significantly associated with asset 
turnover in positive way (the coefficients of both variables are statistically significant at I 
per cent level). 
Additionally, it seems that the coefficient of our proxy for growth opportunities 
(MKTBOOK) is negative, which is in line with the view that high-growth firms have from 
lower asset turnover ratios than low-growth firms. Consistent with the results of Ang et al. 
(2000), Singh and Davidson (2003) and Fleming et al. (2005), we also find that both 
executive ownership and ownership concentration are positively and significantly 
associated with asset turnover (at 5 per cent level). The coefficient of board size, however, 
is negative and statistically significant indicating that firms with larger board size are less 
efficient in their asset utilization, ceteris paribus. Finally, non-executive directors do not 
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seem to add much in the governance of UK firms, a result that may be explained by the 
specificity of the UK corporate governance system (see Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004 and Franks 
et al., 2001 for complementary evidence). 
The second objective of our empirical investigation is to allow for a potential non- 
linear relationship between executive ownership, salary and agency costs (see discussion 
and preliminary graphical investigation in sections 4.2). To do so, we re-estimate model I 
after including both quadratic and cubic salary and executive ownership terms as 
regressors. The results (not reported) do not support such a functional form. Instead, it 
seems that only salary exerts a non linear impact on asset turnover. On the other hand, the 
relationship between executive ownership and asset turnover is linear. Based on this 
evidence, we only retain the square term of salary and the level term of executive 
ownership in our empirical models (see results of model 2). In particular, the results of 
model 2 indicate that at low levels of salary, the relationship between salary and asset 
turnover is positive. At higher levels of salary, however, the relationship turns to negative, 
which is in line with the studies that view executive compensation as an agency problem 
(see, for example, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). We also find that the coefficient of executive 
ownership is positive and statistically significant, which is in line with the agency theory of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). The coefticients of the remaining variables are similar to 
those reported in model 1. 
The last objective of our empirical inv6stigation is to provide more insights as to 
whether corporate governance mechanisms are homogeneous or whether their impact on 
agency costs varies with growth opportunities. As mentioned earlier, some evidence on this 
issue has been put forth in the literature recently by McConnel and Servaes (1995) and 
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Lasfer (2002), within a performance model though. In this study we extend these studies by 
testing for the existence of interaction effects between internal governance mechanisms and 
growth opportunities within an agency framework. To test such a hypothesis, we extend the 
empirical specification of model 2 by allowing for potential interactions between those 
mechanisms found significant in earlier models and growth opportunities, as proxied by the 
market-to-book ratio. The results from such a task, which are presented in model 3, support 
the existence of two interaction effects. First, we find that the positive impact of executive 
ownership on asset turnover is more pronounced in high-growth firms (the coefficient 
EXECOWNER* MKTBOOK is positive and statistically significant. Second, we observe a 
negative and significant coefficient for the term SHORT_DEBT *MKTBOOK, which is 
consistent with the view that the effectiveness of short-term debt in mitigating agency 
problems is lower for high-growth firms. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
short-terrn debt is more effective in mitigating agency problems related to free cash flow, 
which is a common problem in low growth firms, and hence the effectiveness of short term 
debt as a governance device is expected to decrease with growth opportunities. The results 
regarding the existence of interaction effects between executive ownership, short-term debt 
and agency costs serve as complementary evidence to the studies by McConnel and Servaes 
(1995) and Lasfer (2002), which showed that the impact of managerial ownership and 
leverage on corporate performance varies with growth opportunities. 42 
In summary, the results from the multivariate analysis enhance our understanding on 
the determinants of agency costs in two important ways: First, they suggest two additional 
42 The idea behind McConnell and Servae's (1995) analysis is that debt has both a positive and a negative 
impact on the value of the firm because of its influence on corporate investment decisions. What possibly 
happens is that the negative effect of debt dominates the positive effect in firms with more positive net present 
value projects (i. e., high-growth firms). However, the positive effect dominates the negative effect for firms 
with fewer positive net present value projects (i. e., low-growth firms). 
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corporate governance and devices for UK firms, namely debt maturity and managerial 
salary. Second, they strongly support the view that that the relationship between several 
governance mechanisms and agency costs is not homogeneous but varies with growth 
opportunities. 
In particular, our empirical finding reveal that in addition to debt source the maturity 
structure of debt can help reduce agency conflicts between managers and shareholders by 
leading to higher asset utilization ratios. This finding may also explain (at least partly) why 
previous studies that have ignored debt maturity in their models end up with contradicting 
findings regarding the relationship between capital structure and agency costs. 
Additionally, although there is some evidence that the relationship between salary and asset 
turnover is non-monotonic (see model 2), the findings indicate that salary (when it is at low 
levels) can work as an additional mechanism that provides incentives to managers to take 
value-maximizing actions. Regarding the potential interactions between internal 
governance mechanisms, growth opportunities and agency costs, the results show that the 
positive relationship between executive ownership (short-term debt) and asset turnover is 
stronger for the case of high growth (low growth) firms. 
4.4.3 Further Evidence and Robustness Checks 
In this section we carry out several robustness checks to test the validity of our results. 
First, we substitute the variable MKTBOOK with an alternative proxy for growth 
opportunities, which is derived after employing principal component analysis. Principal 
component analysis enables the combination of several variables to develop a composite 
index variable as a proxy for growth opportunities. In particular the variables used in the 
principal component analysis are the following: 
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MK-rBOOK = Book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity to book value of assets; 
MTBE = Market value of equity to book value -of equity; 
METBA = Market value of equity to the book value of assets; 
METD = Market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the book value of assets. 
All these variables, which are highly correlated as shown in Panel A of Table 4.6, 
have been extensively used in the literature as alternative proxies for growth 
opportunities. 43 We extract the growth proxy based on the eigenvalues provided. Each 
factor whose eigenvalue is greater than I explains more variance than any single variable. 
Given that only one eigenvalue is greater than 1, the principal component analysis provides 
us with only one factor that explains firm growth opportunities (see Panel Q. We call the 
composite variable derived from the principal component analysis "GROWTH" and 
incorporate it in our model as an alternative proxy for growth opportunities. Descriptive 
statistics for the variable GROWTH are presented in panel D. 
Table 4.7 presents the results of cross-section analysis after using the variable 
GROWTH as a proxy for growth opportunities. In panel A we use the asset turnover ratio 
as dependent variable. In general, the results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported 
previously. There is strong evidence that executive ownership, ownership concentration, 
salary, short-term debt and, to some extent, bank debt is positively related to asset turnover. 
43 Two statistical tests, the Barlett's test and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test confirm that principal component 
analysis is likely to provide us with a useful proxy for growth opportunities. The first test examines whether 
or not the intercorrelation matrix comes from a population in which the variables are non-collinear (i. e. an 
identity matrix). The second test is a test for sampling adequacy. The results of these tests are provided in 
Panel B of Table 4.6. 
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Also, there is some evidence supporting a non-linear relationship between salary and asset 
turnover (in model 4). Finally, our results clearly indicate that agency costs differ 
significantly across high-growth and low-growth firms and, most importantly, there is a 
significant interaction effect between growth opportunities and executive ownership. 
Contrary to our earlier findings, however, we can not provide any evidence for the 
existence of an interaction between asset turnover and short-term debt. 
- In Panel B of Table 4.7 we substitute the annual sales to total assets with the SG&A 
ratio to measure agency costs. As already mentioned earlier in the chapter, this ratio can be 
used as a direct proxy for agency costs. Our results indicate that executive ownership, 
ownership concentration and total debt help reduce discretionary spending and, therefore, 
the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The coefficient of short-term debt 
is marginally statistically significant (only in model 7) and that of salary is insignificant. 
Also, we find that agency costs and growth opportunities are positively related (i. e. the 
coefficient of the variable GROWTH is positive and statistically significant to the 5 per 
cent level). Finally, our results support the existence of an interaction effect between 
growth opportunities and executive ownership, which is consistent with our earlier 
findings. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the effectiveness of the alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms and devices in mitigating managerial agency problems in the UK market. In 
particular, we have investigated the impact of capital structure, corporate ownership 
structure, board structure and managerial compensation structure on the costs arising from 
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agency conflicts mainly between managers and shareholders. The interactions among 
several internal corporate governance mechanisms and growth opportunities in determining 
the magnitude of these conflicts have also been tested. 
- In addition to managerial ownership and ownership concentration, which 
have 
previously been suggested as effective corporate governance mechanisms, our empirical 
findings suggest that existence of two additional variables, namely short term debt and 
managerial compensation, that can help resolve agency related issues. Moreover, our results 
indicate that "growth opportunities" is a significant determinant of the level of agency costs 
within a firm. Specifically, its seems that high-growth firms indicate lower asset turnover 
ratios and higher expense ratios relative to low-growth firms, possibly because of extensive 
information asymmetries between managers, shareholders and debtholders in high-growth 
firms. Finally, there is strong evidence that the impact of specific governance attributes on 
agency costs varies with growth opportunities. For instance, our results indicate that 
executive ownership is particularly effective as a governance mechanism for high-growth 
firms. This result complements earlier research on corporate performance indicating that 
high-growth firms tend to prefer incentive mechanisms (e. g. Managerial ownership) to 
monitoring mechanisms (e. g. financial leverage) while the opposite is true for low-growth 
firms (see, for example, Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1995 and Lasfer, 2002). 
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Table 4.1: Variables, definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
ASSET TURNOVER The ratio of annual sales to total assets Datastream 
SIG&A The ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total Datastream 
sales 
Ownership structure 
MAN The percentage of equity ownership held by directors Hemscott 
EXECOWNER The percentage of equity ownership held by executive directors Hemscott 
NONEXECOWNER The percentage of equity ownership held by non-executive Hemscott 
directors 
CONCENTR. The sum of the stakes of firm's shareholders with equity Hemscott 
ownership greater than 3 per cent 
Board structure 
NON-EXEC. The ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the Hemscott 
number of total directors on the board 
BOARD SIZE The total number of directors on the board Hemscott 
CEO-DUMMY 
Compensation Structure 
SALARY 
OPTION_DUMMY 
Capital structure 
BANK 
SHORTDEBT 
TOTALDEBT 
Control Variables 
SIZE 
MKTBOOK 
GROWTH 
A dummy variable that takes the value of I when the roles of Hemscott 
CEO and COB are not separated and 0 otherwise 
The total salary paid to executive directors scaled by total assets Hemscott 
A dummy variable, which takes the value of I if the firm pays Hemscott 
options or bonuses to its executives and 0 otherwise. 
Datastream 
The ratio of bank debt to total debt Datastream 
The ratio of short-term debt to total debt Datastream 
The ratio of total debt to total assets Datastream 
Datastream 
Total assets (in logarithm) Datastream 
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of Datastream 
equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets. 
The outcome of common factor analysis (see section 4.4.3 for Our 
details) calculation 
Notes: Datastream database provides accounting and market data. Hemscoll Guru Academic database provides financial 
data for the UK's top 300,000 companies and detailed data on all directors of UK listed companies. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics (N=897) 
Mean Min 25% Median 75% Max 
ASSET_TURNOVER 1.24 0 0.60 1.07 1.64 8. TT 
SG&A 0.45 0.01 0.15 0.28 0.48 6.52 
MAN 14.74 0 0.60 6.28 23.17 99.43 
EXECOWNER 10.68 0 0.20 2.04 14.44 99.43 
NONEXECOWNER 4.06 0 0.04 0.29 2.60 86.28 
CONCENTR. 37.19 0 19.80 36.16 51.59 98.39 
NON-EXEC. 0.495 0 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.86 
- BOARDSIZE 6.97 3 5 7 8 19 
CEO-DYMMY 0.08 0 0 0 0 1 
SALARY 0.012 0 0.001 0.005 0.012 0.284 
OPTION_DUMMY 0.59 0 0 0 0 1 
BANK 55.65 0 22.94 60.60 92.12 100 
SHORTDEBT 49.53 0 25.70 47.58 70.94 100 
TOTALDEBT 18.93 0 6.07 15.51 28.76 94.78 
SIZE 11.16 6.03 9.68 10.98 12.33 18.62 
MKTBOOK 2.09 0.32 1.05 1.47 2.27 17.25 
Notes: This table shows the sample characteristics for 897 firms. Ile means of the variables are measured over the 
period 1999-2003. Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.4: Mean comparison of agency costs- analyzing high (above median) versus low 
(below median) ownership structure, board structure, compensation structure and other firm 
characteristics 
Panel A Panel B 
Asset Asset t-test SG&A SG&A t-test (mean 
turnover turnover (mean mean of mean of compa- 
mean of mean of compa- above below rison 
above below rison) variable variable 
variable variable median median 
median median 
MAN 1.34 1.15 3.09*** 0.50 0.40 1.93* 
EXECOWNER 1.33 1.16 2.83*** 0.52 0.38 2.85*** 
NONEXECOWNER 1.24 1.24 -0.02 0.57 0.37 4.75*** 
CONCENTR 1.31 1.17 2.23** 0.41 0.49 -1.64 
NON-EXEC 1.20 1.27 -1.00 0.45 0.45 0.22 
BOARDSIZE 1.12 1.31 -3.07*** 0.40 0.50 -1.97* 
SALARY 1.38 1.11 4.43*** 0.55 0.35 4.04*** 
BANK 1.31 1.17 2.25** 0.42 0.48 -1.23 
SHORTDEBT 1.41 1.08 5.41*** 0.50 0.40 1.97** 
TOTALDEBT 1.26 1.22 0.67 0.32 0.58 -5.43* 
SIZE 1.22 1.27 -0.85 0.29 0.61 -6.85*** 
MKTBOOK 1.22 1.27 -0.78 0.55 0.36 3.95*** 
Notes: This table presents mean comparison agency costs- analyzing high (above median) versus low (below median) 
ownership, capital structure, board structure, compensation structure and other firm characteristics such as size and 
growth opportunities. Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 4.1. and * indicate coefficient is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.5: Cross Sectional Regressions Prediction Agency Costs 
Der)endent Variable: ASSET TURNOVER 
Independent variables Predicted Model I Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.852 -1.123 -1.140 (-2.25)** (-2.55)** (-2.56)** 
EXECOWNER + 0.005 0.005 0.003 (2.03)** (1.96)** (0.52) 
NONEXECOWNER + 0.005 0.005 0.004 
(1.25) (1.17) (1.14) 
CONCENTR + 0.003 0.003 0.002 (2.09)** (2.07)** (0.88) 
NON-EXEC +/. -0.155 -0.086 -0.068 (-0.58) (-0.32) (-0.26) 
BOARD SIZE +/_ -0.045 -0.048 -0.071 (-2.88)*** (-3.01)*** (-3.69)*** 
DUMMY CEO -0.104 -0-078 -0.076 - (-0.97) (-0.72) (-0.71) 
SALARY + 0.065 0.122 0.134 
(3.54)*** (2.94)*** (2.98)*** 
SALARY2 -0.003 -le-04 (-1.82)* (-0.30) 
DUMMY OPTION + 0.091 0.081 0.081 
_ (1.43) (1.25) (1.28) 
BANK + 0.166 0.171 0.212 
(1.92)* (1.97)** (1.94)* 
DEBT SHORT + 0.438 0.425 0.686 
_ (3.51)*** (3.47)*** (4.35)*** 
DEBT + 0.286 0.294 TOTAL 0.244 
_ (1.13) (1.17) (0.96) 
SIZE + 0.070 0.086 0.092 
(3.01)*** (3.38)*** (3.71)*** 
MKTBOOK -0.031 -0.030 -0.026 
(-2.10)** (-2.01)** (-0.46) 
EXECOWNER* MKTBOOK 0.001 
(1.96)** 
CONCENTR* MKTBOOK 6e-04 
(0.96) 
BOARDSIZE* MKTBOOK 0.008 
(1.57) 
DEBT* MKTBOOK SHORT -0.130 
_ (-2.67)*** 
BANK* MKTBOOK -0.025 
(-0.88) 
SALARY * MKTBOOK -0.007 
(-0.57) 
y2 SALAR *MKTBOOK -3.6c-04 (-0.47) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0,177 0.183 0.193 
Number of firms 897 897 897 
Notes: This table presents cross-sectional regressions predicting agency costs, using asset turnover ratio as an inverse 
proxy for agency costs. Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 4. L All regressions include industry 
dummies. t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to heteroscedasticity standard errors. 
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Table 4.6 
Results from Common Factor Analysis 
Panel. 4: Correlations between the three Droxies 
MKTBOOK MTBE METBA MEBD 
MKTBOOK I 
MTBE 0.559* 1 
METBA 0.991* 0.532* 1 
MEBD 0.993* 0.542* 0.997* 1 
PaneIB: Tests ofsphericity and samp ling adequacy 
Barlett's Test 0.00 
Kaiser-Meycr-Olkin Test 0.799 
PaneIC: Eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix 
12 3 
1.902 0.996 0.193 
Panel D: Correlations between common factors and Proxies for Growth Opportunities 
MKTBOOK MTBE METBA MEBD 
GROWTH 0.984* 0.687* 0.979* 0.982* 
Panel E. - Descriptive statistics for the commonfactors extracted 
Mean Min Median Mar 
-0.02 -0.80 -0.33 5.84 
Notes: This table provides the results of the common factor analysis. Definitions for the variables MKTBOOK, MTWE-, 
METBA and METD are provided in Section 4.2.3. * indicates that correlation is significant at the 5% level (two tailed) 
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Table 4.7: Cross Sectional Regressions Prediction Agency Costs 
Dependent Variable: Panel A: ASSET TURNOVER, Panel B: SG&A to ASSETS 
PanelA Panel B 
Independent variables Predicted Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant +/_ -1.267 -1.17 2.550 2.520 
(-2.74)*** (-2.61)*** (4.16)*** (4.28)*** 
EXECOWNER + 0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.003 
(2.37)** (2.22)** (-2.37)** (-2.14)** 
NONEXECOWNER + 0.004 0.004 -0.007 -0.007 
(1.09) (1.04) (-3.07)*** (-2.84)0** 
CONCENTR + 0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
(2.53)** (2.53)** (-2.47)** (-2.42)** 
NON-EXEC +/_ -0.035 -0-059 0.418 0.475 
(-0.13) (-0.22) (2.42)** (2.57)*** 
BOARD SIZE +/_ -0.048 -0,047 0.025 0.025 
(-3.08)*** (-3.01)*** (2.42)** (1.51) 
DUMMY CEO -0.087 -0-070 -0.011 -0.027 
- (-0.80) (-0.64) (-0.179) (-0.47) 
SALARY + 0.127 0.105 0.028 0.035 
(2.80)*** (2.54)** (0.670) (0.97) 
SALARy2 -0.003 -9e-04 -7e-04 -0.002 
(-1.94)* (-0.55) (-0.36) (-0.945) 
DUMMY OPTION + 0.079 0.083 -0-048 -0.041 
_ (1.17) (1.24) (-1.05) (-0.83) 
BANK + 0.207 0.199 -0.055 -0.061 
(1.17) (2.17)** (-0.60) (-0.83) 
DEBT SHORT + 0.390 0.411 -0.181 -0.216 
_ (3.18)*** (3.30)*** (-1.52) (-1.67)* 
DEBT TOTAL + -0.041 -0.023 -0.586 -0.580 
_ (-0.16) (-0.08) (-2.62***) (-2.69)*** 
SIZE + 0.091 0.086 -0.108 -0.108 
(3.59)*** (3.41)*** (-3.40)*** (-3.61)*** 
MKTBOOK -0.061 -0.254 0.103 0.356 
(-2.14)** (-1.72)* (2.15)** (0.89) 
EXECOWNER* GROWTH 0.006 -0.005 
(3.43)*** (-2.08)** 
CONCENTR*GROWTH 0.022 -0.003 
(1.42) (-1.36) 
BOARDSIZE*GROWTH 0.016 -0-016 
(1.42) (-0.54) 
DEBT*GROWTH SHORT -0.067 -0.010 
_ (-0.65) (-0.05) 
BANK*GROWTH 0.081 0.026 
(1.10) (0.22) 
SALARY * GROWTH -0.025 0.006 
(-1.27) (0.15) 
SALARy2 *GROWTH - -0.5c-04 8.1 e-04 
(-0.07) (0.33) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rý 0.186 0.199 0.217 0.236 
Number of firms 844 844 667 667 
Notes: This table presents cross-sectional regressions predicting agency costs, using asset turnover ratio as an 
inverse proxy for agency costs (Panel A) and the SG&A ratio as a proxy for agency costs (Panel B). Definitions 
for all the variables arc provided in Table 4.1. t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. and * indicate 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Chapter 5 
The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An 
Empirical Investigation Using UK panel Data 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of internal corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating 
the costs of the manager-shareholder agency conflict. Existing literature provides the 
theoretical framework to explain why this conflict arises, what its consequences are, and 
how the agency conflict and its costs can be mitigated. Specifically, it is argued that 
managers have different objectives than outside investors and act in their own best interest 
when opportunities arise, usually at the expense of outside investors. Furthermore, it is 
shown that such opportunities arise more frequently in firms with widely dispersed 
ownership and poor governance, and also in firms characterized by the absence of perfect 
contractual relations and effective monitoring and disciplining mechanisms. Managers in 
such companies are more likely to be entrenched with greater ability to adopt suboptimal 
strategies that include engaging in activities that make managers indispensable, 
manipulating performance measures and resisting takeovers. 44 
Previous empirical research also provides important insights into the consequences of 
the manager-shareholder conflict. It has been shown that entrenched managers prefer lower 
than optimal leverage (Berger et al., 1997; De Jong and Veld, 2001; Brounen et al., 2006); 
choose longer maturity debt (Guney and Ozkan, 2005; Datta et al., 2006); hold large 
amounts of cash (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004 and Harford et al., 
2005); pay lower dividends (Hu and Kumar, 2004; 2005; Khan, 2006); and overinvest 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2001; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005). Previous findings also 
reveal that firms with weak shareholder rights or entrenched managers exhibit significant 
44 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Tirole (2006) for an analytical discussion on various ways in which 
managers may not act in the firm's best interests. 
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underperformance (see Morck et aL, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Gompers et aL, 
2003; Davies et aL, 2005; and Core et al., 2006 among others). 
In addition to the literature that provides insights into the reasons for and the 
consequences of the manager shareholder conflict, there is also a well-developed research 
focusing on the interactions between corporate governance mechanisms and agency costs. 
This literature reports that firms can reduce agency costs and hence improve their 
performance by controlling the costly incentives of managers. This is achieved by adopting 
good external and internal governance practices, which limit the potential for suboptimal 
rnanagerial behaviour. The internal governance mechanisms that have been shown to be 
cffective in this respect include the board of directors, managerial incentives, capital 
structure and dividend policies of firms (see Gi Ilan, 2006 for a survey of recent research on 
corporate governance mechanisms). 
, Despite a great 
deal of attention having been paid to the above aspects of the 
manager- shareholder conflict, there is surprisingly little attempt in the current literature to 
test the relationship between managerial entrenchment and the magnitude of agency costs. 
The main objective of this chapter is therefore to address this gap by focusing on the 
measure of managerial entrenchment and investigating empirically the impact of 
entrenchment on agency costs. In doing so, We hypothesise that good governance practices 
limit the potential for suboptimal managerial behaviour and hence lower agency costs. 
More importantly, we argue that this is achieved by reducing managerial entrenchment, 
defined as the extent to which managers have the ability and incentives to pursue their self- 
interest and expropriate wealth from shareholders. 
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Our empirical strategy to test the above hypothesis has two important aspects which, 
we believe, distinguish our work from previous research significantly. First, we attempt to 
tackle the measurement issues in relation to agency costs and managerial entrenchment. 
Second, we adopt an empirical specification to estimate the relation between entrenchment 
and agency costs, incorporating two crucial features, namely endogeneity and persistency. 
In what follows, we explain how this chapter seeks to address these issues. 
ý- I To test the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs we use 
two proxies for agency costs, namely the asset turnover ratio and the ratio of selling, 
general and administrative expenses to total sales (SG&A). The main proxy we use is the 
asset turnover ratio, defined as the ratio of total sales to total assets. This ratio, used first in 
the agency context by Ang et aL (2000) and later also adopted by Singh and Davidson 
(2004) and Fleming et aL (2005), is taken as an inverse proxy for agency costs and 
interpreted as an asset utilization ratio that shows how effectively management deploys the 
firm's assets. A low asset turnover ratio indicates poor investment decisions, insufficient 
effort, and consumption of perquisites, and hence suggests that agency costs arising from 
the conflicts between managers and shareholders may not be insignificant. For robustness 
purposes, similar to Singh and Davidson (2004), we also use an alternative proxy for 
agency costs, namely the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total sales 
(SG&A). 
As for the measurement of managerial entrenchment, we employ principal component 
analysis to combine a set of corporate governance and managerial incentive variables, 
which are likely to determine the magnitude of managerial entrenchment. Specifically, we 
develop several entrenchment measures by using ownership concentration, board structure, 
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type of blockholders, and voting power of major shareholders as governance indicators; and 
executive ownership and executive compensation as proxies for managerial incentives. In 
doing so, our approach extends previous studies that have focused on only few corporate 
governance variables ignoring the cumulative effect of these influences on agency costs. 
5 
While we focus on the measurement of managerial entrenchment and its impact on 
agency costs, our empirical analysis also casts light on two important features of the 
relationship between entrenchment and agency costs. First, distinct from previous studies, 
we explicitly address the endogeneity problem, which can arise in this context for several 
reasons. For example, it is likely that observable as well as unobservable shocks affecting 
agency costs can also affect managerial entrenchment as well as other firm characteristics 
used in the agency model, including dividend payouts, leverage, and market-to-book ratio. 
It is also possible that observed relations between agency costs and its detenninants reflect 
the effects of agency costs on the latter rather than vice versa (see also Cho, 1998; 
Himmelberg, 1999; and Lemmons and Lins, 2003 for similar concerns about endogeneity 
in the agency context). Clearly, failing to control for these possibilities is likely to yield 
inconsistent estimates. To control for the endogeneity problem, we employ a panel data 
analysis combined with the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation procedure. 
Second, our work differs from existing literature by examining the determinants of 
agency costs in a dynamic framework. The advantages of a dynamic analysis in this context 
45 In most studies of corporate governance, managerial ownership and its higher order terms are used to 
control for the entrenchment effect (see, e. g., Morck et d, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; and Davies 
et aL, 2005 among others). However, there is a wide range of other entrenchment proxies used in the existing 
literature, including variables related to environmental factors such as the the industry in which the firm 
operates (Adams et aL, 2005); entrenchment indexes, based on specific corporate governance provisions that 
restrict shareholder rights and provide protection against takeovers (Gompers et aL, 2003; Cremers and Nair, 
2005; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005); and finally the ultimate ownership structure of companies, measuring 
managerial entrenchment by using the disparity between managerial cash-flow rights and control rights 
(Lemmon and Lins, 2003). 
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are twofold. Firstly, the dynamic specification allows us to investigate whether agency 
costs are persistent over time. Secondly, it enables us to examine whether there is a level of 
agency costs, regarded by managers as equilibrium. We argue that this equilibrium is 
possibly implied by a trade-off between the (private) benefits of expropriation and the 
expected (private) costs of such actions to managers, leading to an optimal level of 
expropriation from managers' point of view. 
46 In line with this view, we argue that the 
rnechanism that determines the optimal level of expropriation also implies the equilibrium 
level of agency costs born by shareholders. One important implication of this argument is 
that, if there is indeed an implied equilibrium level of agency costs, it is possible that 
managers will deviate from the equilibrium from time to time but will attempt to revert to 
it. However, it is also possible that the adjustment to equilibrium is not instantaneous and 
will take sometime due to adjustment costs. 
To conduct our empirical investigation we use a unique dataset for a large sample of 
non-financial UK firms over the period 1999-2005. The UK provides an excellent 
laboratory to study the impact of managerial entrenchment on agency costs. For example, it 
is generally argued that UK companies operate under a corporate governance environment 
characterized by a significant degree of managerial discretion, mainly because of the 
inadequate external discipline by the market for corporate control (Short and Keasey, 1999; 
Franks et aL, 2001; Koke and Renneboog, 2005) and the limited monitoring role of large 
shareholders, institutional investors and boards of directors (Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; 
Goergen and Rennebog, 2001; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 47 
46 See La Porta, et aL (2002) for a theoretical model for the determination of the optimal level of 
expropriation. 
47 The last two decades in the UK have witnessed an intensive discussion of corporate governance issues and 
several reports in the form of "codes of best practice" including Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Ilampel 
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There are important findings emerging from the analysis of this chapter. There is 
strong evidence that firms with high levels of managerial entrenchment exhibit significantly 
lower asset turnover ratio, i. e. higher agency costs. This finding is robust to alternative 
definitions of entrenchment. We also provide evidence that agency costs are persistent over 
time and it seems that managers act as though they have an equilibrium level of agency 
costs to attain. Furthermore, they tend to revert to this equilibrium even if they deviate from 
it temporarily. However, our results suggest that the equilibrium adjustment is a costly 
process and managers cannot adjust to desired levels of agency costs quickly. Finally, the 
results reveal that short-term debt and dividend payments work as effective corporate 
governance devices for UK firms in mitigating the costs of the manager-shareholder agency 
conflict. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2 we provide a 
description of the data. Section 5.3 explains the determinants of managerial entrenchment 
and how we measure entrenchment using principal component analysis. Section 5.4 
presents our empirical findings from univariate and multivariate analyses. This section also 
provides a detailed discussion of the estimation procedures adopted in the chapter. Finally, 
Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
This section presents the data sources and descriptive statistics for the accounting and 
market variables used in our sample. It also provides an analysis of the evolution of the 
(1998) and Higgs (2003) (see Mallin, 2004 and Keasey et al., 2005 for a detailed discussion on the recent 
developments in UK corporate governance). In terms of empirical evidence on UK corporate governance, 
although there are several studies investigating the effects of the Cadbury report on the corporate governance 
of firms (see, e. g., Dahya et. al., 2002; Weir et al., 2002 and Lasfer, 2006), only a few studies utilize up-to- 
date datasets to investigate whether managerial entrenchment still remains a major issue. 
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ownership structure, board structure and managerial compensation structure over the 
sample period. 
5.2.1 Data sources 
II 
For our empirical analysis we use a large sample of listed non-financial UK firms over the 
period 1999-2005. Accounting and market data are obtained from Datastream. In particular, 
we use Datastream to collect information on the following variables: firm size (measured 
by, the logarithm of total assets), market value of equity, annual sales, selling general and 
administrative expenses, total debt, short-term debt, dividend payments and industry 
classification. 
, Information on ownership, board and managerial compensation structures is extracted 
from the Hemscott Guru Academic Database for each of the years from 1999 to 2005. This 
database provides detailed information for each firm on the level of managerial ownership, 
ownership concentration, size and composition of the board and level of salary, bonus, 
options and other benefits paid to managers. In order to distinguish between executive and 
non-executive director holdings, ownership of each director is investigated separately. 
Regarding ownership concentration, we consider all investors (other than managers) with 
- an ownership stake greater than 3 per cent. We also categorize blockholders (those with 
equity ownership greater than 20 per cent and with adequate voting power to establish a 
voting coalition)48 into the following groups: a) executive directors; b) non-executive 
directors; c) family members or unlisted companies; d) non-financial listed corporations; 
and e) financial listed institutions. The main source of information on different types of 
48 The voting power of major shareholders is calculated using power indices (see Section 5.3.2 for details). 
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blockholders is Lexis-Nexis though we supplement this by collecting. information on 
several firms from the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register (several issues). 
Several screening criteria were applied to the data before carrying out the empirical 
analysis. First, we excluded financial firms from the sample because of the specific 
characteristics of their financial ratios and the peculiarity in their regulatory conditions. 
Second, the dataset was cleared of outliers by excluding the values of each variable that lie 
oI utside the I" and the q9th percentile range. Third, we chose those firms with no missing 
data over the period 1999 to 2005. Finally, in order to carry out the GMM estimations we 
kept in the sample only those firms with a minimum of five consecutive years of 
observations. This selection process yields an unbalanced panel of 587 firms and 3,669 
observations. 
5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 5.2 presents detailed descriptive statistics for the variables used in our 
empirical analysis (definitions for all the variables used in this study are provided in Table 
5.1). In general, descriptive statistics are in line with those reported in recent studies for UK 
firms (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Davies et. al., 2005 and Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005). 
Specifically, we observe that the average value of asset turnover ratio, which is our main 
variable of interest, is 1.20, while the average value of SG&A ratio is 0.32. Also, on 
average, firms pay back an amount that equals 2.27 per cent of the book value of their total 
assets as dividends. Also, our proxies for growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio) and 
firm size (logarithm of total assets) have mean values of 1.89 and 11.67, respectively. As 
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for the capital structure variables, the average value of leverage is 18-44 per cent, whereas 
the ratio of debt that matures within one year to total debt is 47.87 per cent. 
5.2.3 Evolution of ownership, board and compensation structure 
Panel B of Table 5.2 reports the evolution of the ownership structure, board structure and 
managerial compensation structure of UK firms over the period 1999-2005. We observe an 
increase in ownership concentration throughout the sample period. In particular, the sum of 
stakes of all investors that hold equity ownership greater than 3 per cent (5 per cent) 
increased from 32.88 per cent (26.93 per cent) in 1999 to 40.86 per cent (32.65 per cent) in 
2005. Also, the proportion of companies with controlling blockholders increased from 
15.68 per cent in 1999 to 19.74 per cent in 2005. Among controlling blockholders, it seems 
that financial institutions increased their influence by dominating 10.51 per cent of firms in 
2005, while the equivalent figure was only 6.44 per cent in 1999. In the same period, the 
proportion of family-unlisted companies that hold controlling blocks of shares dropped 
from 7.28 per cent to 5.78 per cent. We also observe a slight increase in the proportion of 
companies in which other listed corporations are blockholders. The above findings hold 
under the following two definitions for controlling blockholders: a) investors hold 20 per 
cent or more of the firm's total shares; and b) investors hold 20 per cent or more of the 
firm's total shares and, have adequate voting power to change the outcome of key decisions 
of the firm. 
From the results presented in Panel B of Table 5.2, it appears that there is a significant 
decline in the level of executive ownership during the sample period, from 10.19 per cent in 
1999 to 6.79 per cent in 2005. This is consistent with the observation of recent studies that 
explore the evolution of ownership structure of UK firms (see, for example, Marchica and 
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Mura, 2005). As for the board structure variables, while the average board size remains 
stable over time, we observe an increase in the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
company boards, from 46.70 per cent in 1999 to 53.02 per cent in 2005. Notably, there is a 
decrease in the proportion of firms in which the roles of CEO and COB are combined, from 
10.08 per cent in 1999 to 5.79 per cent in 2005. Finally, the statistics show that the level of 
salary and total compensation paid to executive directors increased by 34 per cent and 43 
per cent respectively during the sample period. These increases follow a median cash pay 
increase for UK CEOs from ; E158,000 in 1989 to ; E340,000 in 1997, representing 10 per 
cent average annual growth (see Conyon and Murphy, 2000). 
5.3 Measuring managerial entrenchment 
in this section, we provide a review of the variables used as components of our proxy for 
managerial entrenchment and present the results from the principal component analysis. 
49 
5.3.1 The determinants of entrenchment 
in measuring managerial entrenchment we combine the following set of corporate 
governance characteristics that are likely to be associated with managers' incentives and 
ability to use their discretion and expropriate wealth from shareholders. 
Ownership Concentration. Corporate governance research recognizes the essential role 
performed by major shareholders in monitoring management and restricting managerial 
`9 In addition to the characteristics we include in the analysis, there are several other corporate governance 
attributes that may intensify the manager-shareholder conflict. These include, for example, takeover readiness 
provisions such as poison pills and golden parachutes; and constitutional provisions to prevent majority 
shareholders from having their way such as staggered boards and limits to shareholder bylaw amendments 
(see, e. g., Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005 and Gompers el al., 2003 for a detailed discussion of these provisions). 
However, we could not find reliably detailed data on these attributes for each firm in the sample and hence do 
not incorporate them in the analysis. 
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discretion. Monitoring benefits are proportionate to the equity ownership of shareholders, 
and hence an average small shareholder has little or no incentive to monitor management. 
Conversely, it has been argued that shareholders with substantial equity stakes have greater 
incentives and ability to do so (Friend and Lang, 1988; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In 
the context of the UK market, the existing takeover code and the corporate law that is 
favorable to minority shareholders prevent investors (especially non-institutional investors) 
from holding very large stakes (Franks et al., 2001). One would, then, expect that efficient 
monitoring is mainly exerted by those shareholders who own a controlling stake within the 
firm. In our analysis, the main variable to control for the effect of ownership concentration 
is defined as the sum of stakes of all shareholders (other than managers) with ownership 
levels greater than 3 per cent. For robustness, we also consider higher thresholds at 5 per 
cent and 10 per cent. 
Controlling Blockholders. We recognize that the existence of controlling blockholders, 
defined as those who have the capacity to determine the outcome of particular corporate 
policy decisions, may have significant implications for the level of managerial 
entrenchment. It is generally believed that among major shareholders, controlling 
blockholders, are the ones with the strongest incentives to be active owners. Most studies 
in previous literature classify controlling blockholders as those investors whose ownership 
stake exceeds the 20 per cent level. Although in most companies a 20 per cent threshold is 
likely to yield voting control, there are companies in which a greater threshold may be 
needed (Leech, 2002). Therefore, in addition to the 20 per cent threshold, we identify 
controlling blockholders employing a power indices approach. The main advantage of this 
approach is that in determining control it considers not only the voting power of the largest 
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shareholder but also the dispersion of other shareholders. Specifically, we use Shapley. 
Shubik values, which assign a power index to each large shareholder, reflecting the worth 
of each player of participating in a cooperative game and changing the outcome of a vote. 50 
Then, an investor is characterized as a controlling blockholder if and only if he owns more 
than 20 per cent of firm's stakes and, also, the corresponding Shapley-Shubik value for his 
stakes is greater than that of the average shareholder in the industry in which the firm 
operates. Accordingly, we include a dummy variable in the construction of the 
entrenchment proxy, which denotes whether there exists a controlling blockholder in a 
company or not. 
- Type of Controlling Blockholders. The costs of monitoring across different types of 
large shareholders and controlling blockholders are likely to vary. It is also possible that 
monitoring costs outweigh the private benefits of being active for some controllers. This 
implies that, in addition to its existence, the type of controlling shareholders may have an 
impact on the level of managerial entrenchment. For instance, the generally accepted view 
for the UK market is that financial institutions, mainly due to a lack of monitoring expertise 
50 This analysis is based on the assumption that all major shareholders have incentives to be active monitors in 
the sense of taking part in top decision making in the firm. Specifically, the Shapley-Shubik index is the 
probability that shareholder i is pivotal (i. e. has the ability to change the outcome of a voting game) and is 
defined by (D (u)=j: s! 
(n-s-l)!, 
where s is the number of players of the subset si and n is the total S, n! 
number of players. In estimating the Shapley-Shubik values we initially assume that small shareholders (e. g. 
those with equity stake lower than 3%) have no incentives to participate in voting coalitions. Therefore, 
following Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) we rescale the holdings of large shareholders to 100% prior to 
calculating the Shapley-Shubik index. The resulting values vary within the range 0 (dummy voter) and I 
(dictator) and reflect the worth to each player of participating in a cooperative game that requires 50% +I of 
the rescaled votes to reach absolute control. In addition to the standard Shapley-Shubik index, we relax the 
assumption that small shareholders do not monitor at all and compute the Shapley-Shubik values after 
considering an "oceanic game" in which there is a finite number of large investors and an "ocean" of investors with infinitesimally small equity stakes (i. e. lower than 3%). The idea here is that even a relatively 
small equity stake in large corporations corresponds to a very large monetary value. The results, however, do 
not show a significant difference between the two indexes regarding our classification. To put it differently, it 
seems that in the case of our sample oceanic investors do not significantly affect the power of controlling 
blockholders (for an analytical discussion of such indexes and their application to studies on shareholder 
control of companies see Leech, 2001; and Leech, 2002). 
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and their strong desire to safeguard investment liquidity, are less active investors. On the 
other hand, individual companies and family members are said to have much stronger 
incentives to monitor management (Crespi and Renneboog, 2003; Franks et aL, 2001 and 
Khan, 2006). 
,, In order to control for these 
differences in constructing our entrenchment proxy, we 
classify controlling shareholders into different categories by their type, namely financial 
institutions, family members or unlisted companies, and listed corporations, and 
incorporate a separate dummy variable for each category. 
Non-Executive Directors. Another aspect of corporate governance that may influence the 
level of managerial entrenchment relates to the composition of the board. One argument 
here is that unless a board is independent, monitoring of management will be weak. 
Consistent with this conjecture, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find a positive relationship 
between the percentage of non-executive directors on the board and corporate performance. 
However, there are studies that find exactly the opposite results. For example, the analyses 
by Agrawal and Knoeker (1996), Hermalin and Weisbach (199 1) and Franks et aL (200 1) 
support the view that non-executive directors are usually characterized by a lack of 
information about the firm, do not bring the requisite skills to the job and, hence, prefer to 
play a less confrontational monitoring role. The evidence regarding the governance role of 
non-executive directors in UK companies is mixed (see, e. g. Dahya and Travlos, 2000; 
Weir et aL, 2002; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004 and Hillier et aL, 2005). An argument that has 
gained support recently and was advocated first by Franks et aL (2001) is that the inability 
of the UK regulatory system to enforce the duties of directors causes non-executive 
directors to be passive, leading to higher managerial entrenchment. To control for the 
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influence of non-executive directors on the measure of managerial entrenchment we 
include the ratio of non-executives on the board among the components. 
Board Size. There is no consensus among existing studies regarding the effectiveness of 
the size of the board in monitoring management. On the one hand, several studies following 
Pearce and Zahra (1991) suggest that large boards are particularly effective because they 
provide counsel and advice regarding the strategic options of the firm. On the other hand, 
another strand of the literature supports the view that large boards are value reducing 
because large boards make coordination, communication and decision making more 
cumbersome and hence they are less efficient than small boards (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg 
et al., 1998). In the UK, empirical evidence on the potential corporate governance role of 
board size is also mixed. For example, Conyon (1998) finds that board size has some 
importance in the CEO succession process while Dahya and McConnell (2005), in a similar 
but more recent study, fail to establish a strong link between board size and appointment of 
the CEO process. 
CEO Duality. A two-tier leadership structure suggests that the positions of the chairman 
of the board (COB) and the chief executive officer (CEO) are held by different individuals. 
The Cadbury (1992) report on corporate governance of UK firms stresses that in the 
absence of a two tier leadership structure, the probability that insiders will engage in 
opportunistic behaviour is higher. Recent empirical evidence for UK firms, however, does 
not indicate a significant association between CEO duality and corporate performance (see, 
for example, Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et aL, 2002 and Florackis, 2005). To 
control for the effect of a corporate leadership structure on our entrenchment proxy, we 
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incorporate in the principal component analysis a dummy variable that takes the value of I 
if the roles of COB and CEO are not separated and 0 otherwise. 
Executive Ownership. According to the convergence of interests hypothesis executive 
ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. It is argued that 
executive ownership works as an incentive mechanism to prevent managers from 
expropriating wealth from outside shareholders. There is, however, evidence that the 
relationship between executive ownership and corporate performance is not necessarily 
linear and that the ultimate effect of executive ownership on performance is determined by 
a trade-off between the alignment and the entrenchment effects (see Short and Keasey, 
1999; Florackis, 2005 and Davies et aL, 2005 for recent UK evidence). Accordingly, in 
measuring managerial entrenchment we attempt to incorporate both aspects of managerial 
ownership. However, preliminary regressions of executive ownership on our proxies for 
agency costs suggest that only the level term of executive ownership is statistically 
significant and, as a result, only this term is included among the variables that determine 
the level of managerial entrenchment. 51 
Executive Compensation. The compensation package that managers receive constitutes 
another component of corporate governance that is likely to be associated with the level of 
managerial entrenchment. Since the studies by Murphy (1999) and Core et al. (2003) a 
growing strand of the literature treats executive compensation as a potential corporate 
governance mechanism that mitigates the agency conflict between managers and 
f 
51 In particular, we have regressed our proxies for agency costs against the level, square and cubic terms of 
executive ownership. The results, however, do not support any of the hypothesized non-linear structures and 
only the linear terms of executive ownership is found to be significant (both at the 5% level). This finding, 
which is consistent with earlier studies on agency costs that support a linear relationship between ownership 
structure and agency costs (see, e. g., Ang et. al., 2000; Singh and Davidson, 2003 and Fleming et al., 2005), 
prompted us to use only the level term of executive ownership in constructing our entrenchment proxy 
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shareholders (see, for example, Hutchinson and Gul, 2004 and Linn and Park, 2006 for 
recent evidence). However, there is a strand of the literature that considers executive 
compensation as part of the agency problem (see Berger et al, 1997; Fried and Bebchuk, 
2003). According to this view, attractive compensation packages usually create an 
environment ripe for abuse, leading to a high level of managerial entrenchment. Consistent 
with this view, concerns about the excessive remuneration packages of managers in the UK 
have led to the establishment of basic recommendation in the form of "best practices" for 
issues related (among others) to the level and the structure of managerial compensation 
(Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995 and Hampel, 1998). 
In order to incorporate the effects of executive compensation in our analysis, we first 
include the executive salary among the variables that are likely to influence the level of 
managerial entrenchment. In an attempt to control for the effect of other compensation 
components on entrenchment, we later substitute total executive remuneration, which 
represents the sum of salary, options, bonuses and other benefits that executive directors 
receive, for the initial salary variable. 
5.3.2 Results from the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
As mentioned earlier, in this study we utilize PCA to measure managerial entrenchment. 
There are mainly two reasons for using this methodology. First, PCA enables us to combine 
a wide set of governance variables in constructing a single entrenchment proxy. Earlier 
studies either consider a restricted set of variables as attributes of managerial entrenchment 
or ignore to a significant extent the multicollinearity problem that may arise when several 
corporate governance and control variables are independently incorporated in empirical 
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models. 52 Controlling for potential interrelations is crucial for the analysis of the UK 
companies given the recent evidence that several corporate governance mechanisms work 
as substitutes in mitigating agency problems (Weir et aL, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2003; 
Florackis, 2005; Lasfer, 2006). Second, a further advantage of PCA is that it automatically 
produces weights so that the entrenchment proxy will explain much of the variance in the 
group of corporate governance attributes and, therefore, does not require the ex ante 
determination of the weights. Most of the earlier studies that attempt to establish 
entrenchment ranking variables rely on the strong assumption that all the corporate 
governance attributes contribute equally to the entrenchment proxy (see, for example, 
Gompers et aL, 2003; Bebcbuk and Cohen, 2005; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Adams et aL, 
53 2005). 
Table 5.3 presents the results from the PCA. 54 In panel A we report the correlation 
matrix of the nine variables used as attributes of the entrenchment proxy. Three different 
definitions for managerial entrenchment are put forward. Our narrowest definition, 
ENTRENCHMENT 1, combines six variables, namely ownership concentration, non- 
executive director ratio, board size, CEO duality, executive ownership and executive 
compensation. The findings in Panel B of Table 5.3 suggest that ownership concentration 
and executive ownership contribute negatively to the entrenchment proxy, while the 
52 The studies by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et aL, (2006) are among the exceptions, which 
attempt to estimate simultaneous equations systems considering potential interrelations among the alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
53 PCA has also been used in other contexts for data reduction purposes. Callahan et al. (2003), for example, 
combine ten governance variables via PCA to construct an index of managerial involvement in director 
nomination process. To ensure the validity of PCA in the context of our study, two statistical tests, the Barlett's 
test and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test are conducted. The first test examines whether or not the 
intercorrelation matrix comes from a population in which the variables are non-collinear (i. e. an identity matrix) 
and the second test is a test for sampling adequacy. In both cases the tests support the view that the data are likely to 
factor well. 
54 Before carrying out the principal component analysis all variables are normalized. 
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converse is true for the non-executive ratio, board size, CEO duality and executive 
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compensation, which is in line with our expectations. 
The second definition (ENTRENCHMENT 2) includes an additional set of variables 
related to the role and identity of controlling shareholders in determining the magnitude of 
managerial entrenchment. Specifically, it includes a dummy variable that denotes the 
existence of a controlling blockholder among shareholders. Moreover, it also distinguishes 
between financial institutions and family or unlisted companies by including corresponding 
dummy variables for each type of blockholder. The three additional variables contribute 
negatively to the entrenchment index with the variable that refers to the existence of 
controlling blockholder having the greatest weight. 
Finally, the third definition (ENTRENCHMENT 3) incorporates information about 
the voting power of each shareholder in defining blockholders. The weights of the variables 
retain their signs but under this definition the variables related to ownership concentration 
and the existence and type of controlling blockholders contribute to a much greater extent 
to the composite entrenchment index than the variables related to board structure and 
compensation structure. Panel C of Table 5.3 reports analytic descriptive statistics for the 
three alternative proxies of managerial entrenchment. 
55 It is worth noting here that the negative weight of the executive compensation variable is against the 
incentive role that compensation can play in motivating managers to maximize the value of the firm. 
However, the negative weight is consistent with studies that view compensation as part of the agency 
problem. 
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5.4 Empirical Results 
5.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
In Table 5.4 we report univariate mean-comparison tests of the subgroups of firms 
categorized on the basis of above and below median values for several firm-specific 
characteristics. In Panel A, using a Mest, we test the hypothesis that firms with above 
rnedian values of these characteristics differ from firms with below median values with 
respect to the asset turnover ratio. The results are generally in line with our expectations 
and strongly support the hypothesis that the effectiveness of firms in utilizing their assets 
changes with the level of managerial entrenchment. Specifically, we find that firms with 
above median entrenchment levels have significantly lower asset turnover ratios relative to 
firms with below median entrenchment levels, which possibly suggests higher agency costs 
for above median firms. The difference between the means is statistically significant under 
all three definitions of managerial entrenchment. 
We also find that firms with above median values for dividend, market to book and 
short-terrn debt have relatively high asset turnover. On the other hand, firms with above 
median leverage values indicate relatively lower asset turnover. These results are 
statistically significant at the I per cent level. Additionally, the results reveal that among 
ownership characteristics, only ownership concentration, when defined as the sum of stakes 
of those investors with equity ownership greater than 3 per cent, and executive ownership 
are significantly associated with asset turnover. In particular, it appears that firms with 
above median ownership concentration (executive ownership) have an asset turnover of 
1.23 (1.29), while firms with below median ownership concentration (executive ownership) 
have an asset turnover of 1.17 (1.11). The results regarding the board structure variables are 
also statistically significant and reveal that firms with below median values of non- 
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executive directors ratio and board size have lower asset turnover. This is consistent with 
our earlier argument that, in the context of the UK market, large boards and the boards 
dominated by non-executive directors are not necessarily more efficient. There is also 
evidence that firms in which the roles of CEO and COB are separated have higher asset 
56 turnover relative to those in which these roles are held by the same person. 
ý, 'In Panel B of Table 5.4 we conduct a similar investigation by examining whether 
firms with high asset turnover differ from firms with low asset turnover with respect to 
several characteristics, including the level of managerial entrenchment. For this purpose, 
we compare firms in the first quartile of the asset turnover distribution with those in the 
fourth quartile. We find evidence that, on average, firms in the fourth asset turnover 
quartile pay more dividends and have higher levels of short-term debt than firms in the first 
asset turnover quartile. The proportions of blockholders and the stakes held by executive 
directors are also higher in the fourth quartile firms. However, the fourth quartile firms are 
more likely to have the same person as CEO and COB, and to have higher non-executive 
director ratios and larger board sizes. Finally, consistent with our expectations, the 
univariate analysis provides evidence that firms with relatively high asset turnover ratios 
exhibit significantly lower levels of managerial entrenchment. This finding, though, hold 
only under the first and third entrenchment proxies. 
56 For robustness, we provide further univariate analysis results by using the industry median for each variable 
rather than the sample median as a segmenting criterion. Although most results remain robust, in particular 
those that concern the impact of managerial entrenchment on asset turnover, we find that firms categorized on 
the basis of above and below median values of market to book, ownership concentration and CEO duality do 
not seem to have significantly different asset turnover ratios (results not reported for brevity). 
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5.4.2 Multivarlate Analysis 
5.4.2.1 Empirical model and method of estimation 
As mentioned earlier, our main hypothesis is that asset turnover ratio, an inverse proxy for 
agency costs, is negatively related to managerial entrenchment. Furthermore, following the 
extant literature on agency costs and corporate performance, we expect that dividend 
payouts, corporate leverage and short-term debt are expected to have a positive influence 
on asset turnover. This rests on the view that these variables may work as effective 
corporate governance devices and hence are expected to lower agency costs. McConnell 
and Servaes (1995) and more recently Harvey et al. (2004) have pointed out that leverage 
can act as an effective corporate governance device by reducing the agency costs of free 
cash flow. Similarly, high dividend payouts ensure that fewer liquid assets are left at the 
discretion of managers. Greater dividend payouts also expose managers to greater 
monitoring by existing and prospective financiers (Easterbrook, 1984). 
Similarly, it is widely acknowledged that, in addition to total debt, the maturity 
structure of debt may influence agency costs. For example, short-term debt is usually 
considered as an effective instrument in reducing the expected costs of the underinvestment 
problem. 57 Finally, the signs of the estimated coefficients of market to book ratio and firm 
size are expected to be positive and negative respectively. That is, larger firms and firms 
with less attractive growth opportunities face fewer informational problems (Jensen and 
57 It is argued that firms with greater growth opportunities should have more short-term debt because 
shortening debt maturity would make it more likely that debt will mature before any opportunity to exercise 
the growth options (Myers, 1977). Consistent with this prediction, there are empirical studies that find a 
negative relation between maturity and growth opportunities (see, for example, Ozkan, 2000 among others). Also, an empirical study by Florackis (2005) finds that short-term debt is positively related with Tobin's Q. 
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Meckling, 1976), leading to a lower magnitude of agency costs between managers and 
shareholders. 
58 
We investigate the impact of managerial entrenchment on agency costs by adopting a 
dynamic model. Our empirical specification is as follows: 
K 
aY,, -, 
+ 1: 5, Z,, + n, + n, + u,, 
k=l 
where Y represents our proxy for agency costs, X is our proxy for managerial entrenchment, 
Z is a vector of the control variables that include dividends, short-term debt, market-to- 
book ratio, leverage and firm size while the terms nj and nj represent respectively time- 
invariant firm-specific (fixed) effects and firm-invariant time-effects and capture the effects 
of unobserved firm heterogeneity and economy-wide factors that are outside the firm's 
control. The subscripts i and t denote firms and years respectively. 
ýI 
As discussed earlier, distinct from the existing research on the empirical 
determinants of agency costs, the nature of our model specification is dynamic. Equation 
(1) therefore contains a lagged dependent variable, Ylt. 1, recognizing the possibility that 
managers cannot adjust instantaneously to the desired level of agency costs, if any, 
following changes in firm-spccific characteristics in the underlying trade-off model, which 
was mentioned earlier, and/or random economy-wide shocks. Our dynamic partial 
adjustment specification implicitly assumes that the change in agency costs between 1-1 and 
t is given by 
yit - yil_i = A(Yit* - yit-1) (2) 
58 It is worth noting here that the negative relationship between market to book and asset turnover holds only 
in cases when the agency problems related to asymmetric information and underinvestment, which are less 
common in low-growth firms, are more severe than the free cash flow problems, which are more prevalent in 
low-growth firms. 
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where Yj, is the actual level of agency costs at time t, while can be interpreted as 
the desired change in agency costs. Clearly, ?, gives the fraction of the desired change 
managers can achieve and its value lies between 0 and 1. If %=I, it follows that managers 
can adjust the level of agency costs immediately, i. e. Y*u=Yii, implying costless adjustment. 
The other extreme, i. e. when %=O, suggests that managers cannot change at all the existing 
level of agency costs due to excessive adjustment costs, i. e. Yi, =Y11-1. Obviously, this is an 
extreme situation in which no change takes place in the level of agency costs from one 
period to another. More importantly, this holds even if managers are prepared to, say, lower 
agency costs by, for example, reducing the amount of expropriation. Equally, we argue that 
what static models of agency costs imply, i. e., the perfect ability of managers to adjust 
instantaneously to the desired level of agency costs, is also highly unlikely. Our model 
specification, given in Equation (1), allows us to estimate the adjustment speed, X, which 
equals (I -a), explicitly accounting for adjustment costs. 
For the estimation of equation (1) we avoid the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and within group estimators (WG) because these estimators are likely to yield inconsistent 
estimates. Specifically, in the case of the OLS estimator, assuming n, to be stochastic 
implies that the lagged explanatory variable Yit-1 is positively correlated with the error term 
(nj + u1j) due to the presence of unobserved fixed effects. The WG estimator resolves this 
inconsistency by eliminating ni by transforming the original observations into deviations 
from the time mean of each variable. However, this transformation induces a correlation 
between the transformed dependent variable and the transformed error term. 59 
As discussed earlier, another estimation problem, which is not necessarily specific to 
the dynamic specification, related to the endogeneity problem. In addition to the reasons as 
59 See Bond (2002) for an analytical discussion of these issues. 
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to why the endogeneity problem may arise, it is worth mentioning the possibility that some 
of the regressors may be correlated with the past and current values of the idiosyncratic 
component of disturbances, ult in Equation (1). 
ýýý Due to the problems outlined above, in this chapter we adopt an instrumental 
variables approach (IV), where the lagged dependent variable and endogenous regressors 
are instrumented. In particular, we utilize a GMM method of estimation, which provides 
consistent estimates by utilizing instruments. that are obtained from the orthogonality 
condition between the regressors and the error term in (1). A GMM specification of the first 
differences (GMM-DIFF) is initially estimated, which uses instruments dated 1-2 and earlier 
(see, Arellano and Bond, 2001). The consistency of this estimator depends only on the 
validity of instruments used, which in turn depends on the absence of higher order serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic component of the error term. Therefore, the Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis that instruments are valid, and the 
two tests for existence of first and second order 'Serial correlation in the first differenced 
residual (denoted as mI and m2 respectively) are reported. 
Additionally, we report the results from the GMM system estimator (GMM- 
SYSTEM), which exploits additional moment conditions by combining a set of first 
differenced equations and a set of equations in levels. It has been shown that the GMM- 
SYSTEM estimator leads to a significant gain in terms of efficiency and is particularly 
useful in cases when the series have near unit root properties (see Blundell and Bond, 1998 
and Bond, 2002). Both for the GMM-DIFF and the GMM-SYSTEM estimators, we 
compute and report the two-step GMM results using the small variance correction 
suggested by Windmeijer (2000). 
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5.4.2.2 GMM Results 
Turning to the results in Table 5.5, Panel A presents the findings obtained from the GMM- 
DIFF estimator. Model I incorporates our narrow definition of entrenchment, 
ENTRENCHMENT 1, which controls for the effect of the finn characteristics related to the 
firm's ownership, board and managerial compensation structures but does not take into 
account the role of controlling shareholders. In subsequent models we incorporate the more 
general entrenchment proxies, namely ENTRENCHMENT 2 and ENTRENCHMENT 3, 
accounting for the existence and identity of controlling blockholders (Model 2) as well as 
the voting power of major shareholders within firms (Model 3). All three models, which 
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use instruments for endogenous variables dated [t-2], perform well. More specifically, the 
Wald (joint) test provides evidence that supports the joint significance of all the regressors 
in the model, and the Wald (time) test supports the view that economy-wide events which 
are common to all firms in the sample play a significant role in determining the asset 
utilization ratio of firms. Furthermore, the Sargan statistic confin-ns the validity of 
instruments used and the ml and m2 tests as expected confirm the existence of scrial 
correlation of order one, but not of order two. 
The results in Table 5.5 for the first three specifications (Models 1-3) suggest that 
the dynamic nature of our agency costs model is not rejected. Specifically, the estimated 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant at the I per cent 
60 We investigate whether the explanatory variables are predetermined or strictly exogenous with respect to 
the error term. To do this, we start using instruments dated t-2 for each regressor. Later, we add the instrument 
dated M to analyse the potential bias arising from the correlation between xj,, -j and the first-differcnced error 
term. To investigate the possibility of strict exogeneity we also include the current value, xi,,, in the instrument 
set. This investigation leads us to conclude that the explanatory variables are neither predetermined nor 
strictly cxogenous. We, therefore, use instruments dated t-2 in our estimation (see also Blundell et al., 1992). 
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level. The adjustment speed, given by I minus the estimated coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable, is about 0.60 in the first three model specifications. This finding 
suggests that managers face substantial costs when they wish to adjust to the equilibrium 
level of agency costs, where the optimal level is not constant over time and changes with 
the changes in the determinants of agency costs. The value of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable implies that it takes more than three years to complete the adjustment. 
This in turn suggests that agency costs are persistent over time. 
Our findings in relation to the dynamic nature of the agency model lies between the 
view of perfect contractual possibilities, i. e. adjustment costs are zero, and the view of no 
recontracting possibilities, i. e. adjustment costs are excessive. Under the latter view there is 
no possibility of alignment, while the former view rests on the ability of managers and/or 
shareholders to correct suboptimal contracts instantaneously. 61 
In line with our main hypothesis, the results provide strong evidence that managerial 
entrenchment is inversely related with asset turnover ratio. Under all specifications, 
regardless of the specific definition, the estimated coefficient of entrenchment proxy is 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. This finding supports the hypothesis that the 
incentives of managers to pursue their own interests and expropriate wealth from outside 
investors are reflected on the firm's ability to utilize its assets effectively. To put it 
differently, all else being equal, higher managerial entrenchment leads to greater agency 
costs. As expected, the coefficients of dividend and short-term debt are also positive and 
61 It is worth mentioning that managers/shareholders may wish to adjust to a new level of agency costs mainly 
for two reasons. First, they may be away from their desired level of agency costs and wish to revert to the 
desired level. Second, there may be changes in circumstances, which encourage managers to change agency 
costs. For example, changes in ownership structure may lead to a different level of desired agency costs 
because of managers' ability, and indeed their incentives, to expropriate would change with the new 
ownership structure. 
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statistically significant. This is consistent with the findings of prior empirical research for 
UK firms, which suggest that dividend payments and short-term debt can potentially work 
as effective corporate governance devices by restricting managerial discretion in spending 
company's resources (see, Farinha, 2003 and Khan, 2006 for dividend payments; and 
Guney et aL, 2005 and Florackis, 2005 for short-term debt). 
In our final specification in Panel A (Model 4) we re-estimate the specification given 
in Model 3 after putting forward a GMM-SYSTEM estimator, according to which, for the 
equations in first differences, levels dated [t-2] were used as instruments whereas for the 
equations in levels, first differences dated [t-1] were used as instruments. It seems that 
Model 4 is also well specified. In addition to the statistical tests provided for earlier 
specifications, the Sargan difference statistic supports the validity of the additional 
moments conditions utilized in GMM-SYSTEM in all cases. As for the results, they 
support our earlier findings that managerial entrenchment and asset turnover are negatively 
related though the coefficient of the variable ENTRENCHMENT 3 is statistically 
significant only at the 10 per cent level. Moreover, the coefficients of the lagged turnover 
ratio, dividend ratio and short-term debt retain their signs and are all statistically significant 
at the I per cent level. 
5.4.2.3 Additional Checks 
Our first robustness check relates to the proxy we use for agency costs. We incorporate an 
alternative measure of agency costs in our empirical model. More specifically, we estimate 
our preferred empirical specification by replacing the asset turnover ratio with the ratio of 
selling, general and administrative expenses to total sales (SG&A). As discussed earlier, the 
asset turnover ratio is a widely accepted proxy for agency costs (see, e. g., Ang et al., 2000; 
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Singh and Davidson, 2003; Fleming et aL, 2005). However, it is argued that the SG&A 
ratio can be used as a direct proxy of managerial agency costs because the SG&A expenses 
may reflect better the managerial discretion in spending company resources. These 
expenses include, among others, commissions charged by agents to facilitate transactions, 
travel expenses for executives, advertising and marketing costs, rents and other utilities. 
- In Panel B of Table 5.5 (Models 5-6), we present the results obtained from this 
exercise. In particular, Model 5 presents the results from the GMM-DIFF estimator whereas 
Model 6 presents the results from the GMM-SYSTEM estimator. In general, the results 
regarding our main hypothesis are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained in Models 14. 
Specifically, our entrenchment proxy enters positively in both models, which is in line with 
the argument that high levels of managerial entrenchment lead to high expense ratios. 
However, the findings suggest that short-term debt and dividend payouts exert a negative 
impact though only the estimated coefficient of short-term debt seems to be statistically 
significant. Finally, the dynamic features of the alternative specifications are similar in that 
the adjustment speed suggested by the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is about 
0.70 in Model 5 and 0.50 in Model 6.62 
Clearly, the impact of managerial entrenchment on agency costs may depend on 
firm characteristics such as the firm's growth opportunities and its financial status. To 
explore these possibilities we incorporate a set Of dummy variables in the analysis and 
interact them with the entrenchment proxy. First, we use a dummy variable that takcs a 
value of I if the firm has a market-to-book ratio that lies below the median value and 0 
otherwise. As expected, the coefficient of the interaction term, DUMMYMKT13OOK* 
62 An additional alternative proxy for agency costs between managers and shareholders, which is not used in 
our paper though, is the interaction of company's growth opportunities with its free cash flow (see Doukas et 
al., 2000 and Doukas et. al, 2002). 
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ENTRENCHMENT, is negative, possibly suggesting a more pronounced negative 
relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs for the case of low growth 
firms. However, the estimated coefficient is insignificant. These findings also hold when 
we incorporate the alternative proxy for agency costs, the SG&A ratio. Second, we also 
attempt to gain insights into whether the firm's financial status plays a significant role in 
impacting the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs. For 
example, we incorporate a dummy variable that takes a value of I if the firm 
simultaneously has a market-to-book ratio that lies below the median value and a cash 
holdings ratio - defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets - that 
lies above the median value. We argue that such firms, namely cash-rich f inns with lower 
growth opportunities, should be more susceptible to managerial agency problems such as 
ovcrinvestment. We find that the negative effect of entrenchment on agency costs is 
stronger. More specifically, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term, 
DUMMY(MKTBOOK+CASH)*ENTRENCHMENT, is negative and significant at the 10 per cent 
level. The results are not reported for brevity but available upon request from the authors. 
Overall, the results of these additional tests indicate that most of our results arc 
robust to alternative measures of agency costs and provide limited evidence that the impact 
of managerial entrenchment on agency costs may be dependent upon some financial firm 
characteristics and growth opportunities. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The manager-shareholder agency conflict has been well-documentcd in the finance 
literature. Focusing on the incentives of managers and their ability to expropriate wealth 
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from outside shareholders, this chapter investigates whether firms having managers with 
greater entrenchment suffer from higher agency costs. We present strong evidence that a 
variety of firm characteristics explain managerial entrenchment which in turn has a 
significant impact on agency costs. More specifically, it seems that ownership and board 
structures and managerial compensation are important in determining the extent of 
managerial entrenchment. Furthermore, after controlling for endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity, using asset turnover ratio as our main proxy of agency costs we show that 
the manager-shareholder agency conflict is much more costly to firms with entrenched 
managers. We also find that agency costs are negatively related to dividend payouts and 
short-term debt. 
The dynamic analysis of this chapter reveals that agency costs bom by shareholders 
are persistent over time and managers act as though there is an equilibrium level of these 
costs they wish to attain. We argue that this is implied by a trade-off between the expected 
private benefits and private costs of expropriation accrued to managers where the trade-off 
determines the optimal level of expropriation. We also observe that managers deviate from 
the equilibrium level of agency costs but attempt to revert to it, though with some delay 
possibly due to significant adjustment costs. These are new insights into the analysis of 
agency costs, which suggest new avenues of future research. One such avenue relates to the 
determinants of the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium level of agency costs. 
However, to do so, there is need for further research to establish whether there is a level of 
agency costs in the first place, which managers envisage as equilibrium. Another avenue of 
future research is to focus on the interaction between the financial status of firms and 
managerial entrenchment in determining agency costs born by shareholders. 
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Table 5.1 
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
I Va-nable Definition and Source 
Dependent Variables 
ASSET TURNOVER 
SG&A 
Independent Variables 
DIVIDEND 
MK, fl3oOK 
LEVERAGE 
SHoRTDEBT 
SIZE ' 
EXECOWNER 
CONCENTR (3%) 
The ratio of annual sales to total assets (Dalastream) 
The ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total sales (Datastream) 
The ratio of dividend payments to total assets (%) (Datastream) 
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity to book value of assets. (Datastream) 
The ratio of total debt to total assets (%) (Datastream) 
The ratio of short-term debt to total debt (%) (Datastream) 
Total assets (in logarithm) (Datastream) 
The percentage of equity ownership held by executive directors (Ilemscott) 
The sum of the stakes of firm's shareholders with equity ownership greater than 3 per 
cent) (Hemscott) 
CONCENTR (5%) The sum of the stakes of firm's shareholders with equity ownership greater than 5 per 
cent (Hemscott) 
3 LARGEST The sum of the stakes of firm's three largest investors (Ilemscott & Lexis Nexis & 
Pricewaterhouse Corporate Register (hereafter PWQ) 
CONTROL. BLOCKS 
FAMILY BLOCKS 
FINANCIAL BLOCKS 
OTHER LISTED BLOCKS 
p, NONEXEC 
BOARD SIZE 
CEO-DUALITY 
SALARY 
TOTAL COMPENSAT. 
A dummy variable that takes the value of I if the firm has a controlling shareholder, and 
0 otherwise. Controlling shareholders are defined in two ways: a) those who own 20% 
or more of firms stakes and b) those who own 20% or more of firm's stakes and, also, 
have enough voting power (as measured after utilizing power indices) to participate in 
voting coalitions and change the outcome of a voting game (see Section 5.3.1 for more 
details) (Hemscott & Lexis Nexis & PWQ 
A dummy variable which takes the value of I if the controlling shareholder is a family 
member or an unlisted company, and 0 otherwise. (Lexis Nexis & Ilemscolt & PIVQ 
A dummy variable which takes the value of I if the controlling shareholder is a financial 
institution and 0 otherwise. (Hemscott & Lexis Nexis & PWQ 
A dummy variable which takes the value of I if the controlling shareholder is another 
listed company and 0 otherwise. (Hemscolt & Lexis Nexis & PJVQ 
The ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the number of total directors on 
the board N (Hemscott) 
The total number of directors on the board (Hemscott) 
A dummy variable indicating whether the position of CEO and chairman of the board 
are held by the same person. (Hemscott) 
The average salary paid to executive directors (Hemscott &Annual Reports) 
The average total compensation (salary + options + bonuses + other benefits) paid to 
executive directors. (Hemscott &Annual Reports) 
ENTRENCHMENT (1,2 Three composite variables derived after using principal component analysis (see Section 
and 315.3.1 for details). (our own calculation) 
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Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the final sample used in the current study. Panel A reports detailed 
descriptive statistics for all the accounting and market variables. Panel B includes information about the evolution 
of ownership structure, board structure and managerial compensation structure of UK firms during the period 
1999-2005 (mean values and standard deviations). Definýitions for all variables are provided in Table 5.1. 
panel A: Descriptive Statistics (1999-2005) 
Mean St. Dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max Skewness Kurfosts 
TURNOVER 1.20 0.8 0 0.63 1.08 1.58 7.21 1.34 6.42 
SG&A 0.32 0.41 0.006 0.133 0.221 0.369 6.16 6.82 70.51 
DIVIDEND 2.27 2.75 0 0 1.78 3.23 49.30 4.77 57.67 
MKTBOOK 1.89 1.80 0.11 1.03 1.36 2.00 19.62 4.49 30.08 
LEVERAGE 18.44 16.64 0 3.36 15.91 29.08 99.24 0.98 3.98 
SHORTDEBT 47.87 43.03 0 24.11 47.90 7.27 100 1.82 7.88 
SIZE 11.67 2.04 6.65 10.25 11.46 13.06 18.94 0.38 2.84 
Panel B: Evolution of Ownership, Board and Compensation Structure 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Allyears 
Ownership Structure 
CONCENTR (3%) 32.88 33.14 33.96 35.77 36.06 37.54 40.86 35.79 
(18.34) (19.19) (19.55) (19,51) (19.29) (19.20) (19.23) (19.38) 
CONCENTR (5%) 26.93 27.28 28.63 29.11 29.33 30.11 32.65 29.21 
(15.88) (17.30) (17.84) (18.17) (17.95) (17.65) (18.19) (17.74) 
3 LARGEST 25.38 25.53 25.84 26.79 27.31 27.68 28.96 26.80 
(13.46) (15.17) (15.26) (14.91) (15.20) (14.54) (14,02) (14.78) 
CONTROL. BLOCKS 15.68 17.52 17.00 17.92 18.87 20.00 19.74 18.21 
(36.42) (38.05) (37.63) (38.38) (39.16) (40.03) (39.85) (38.59), 
FAMILY BLOCKS 7.28 6.29 5.79 5.29 5.83 6.02 5.78 5.97 
(26.02) (24.29) (23.38) (22.40) (23.45) (23.80) (23.39) (23.69) 
FINANCIAL BLOCKS 6.44 8.95 7.66 9.39 9.09 10.62 10.51 9.05 
(24.58) (28.58) (26.63) (29.19) (28.77) (30.83) (30.71) (28.69) 
OTHER LISTED BLOCKS 0.84 1.14 1.36 1.53 1.72 1.77 2.15 1.53 
(9.14) (10.64) (11.60) (12.31) (12.93) (13.20) (14.51) (12.26) 
EXECOWNER 10.19 10.74 10.38 8.88 8.30 7.75 6.79 8.98 
(15.82) (15.89) (15.94) (14.58) (14.00) (13.19) (12.21) (14.61) 
Board structure 
RNONEXEC 46.70 47.64 48.85 49.46 50.32 51.35 53.02 49.72 
(15.18) (14.50) (14.09) (14.49) (14.53) (14.46) (13.71) (14.51) 
130ARDSIZE 7.65 7.50 7.33 7.21 7.30 7.34 7.40 7.31 
(2.46) (2.43) (2.40) (2.30) (2.42) (2.36) (2.40) (2.39) 
CEO-DUALITY 10.08 9.14 8.52 8.53 7.72 4.96 5.79 7.74 
(30.15) (28.85) (27.94) (27.96) (26.71) (21.72) (23.39) (26.73) 
Compensation Structure 
SALARY (f) 154,722 154,600 168,398 174,438 181,725 190,696 207,256 176,545 
(99,832) (102,542) (109,573) (111,258) (117,958) (129,437) (133,764) (117,028) 
TOTAL COMPENSAT. (f) 238,959 236,271 257,718 269,679 289,155 309,111 341,337 278,264 
(224.830) I'll -7 1A '7% P! ? 66,571) 
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Table 5.3 
Results from Principal Component Analysis 
This Table provides the results of the principal component analysis, which has been used in order to create the 
proxies for managerial entrenchment. Panel A reports the correlation coefficients among the entrenchment 
components whereas Panel B reports the weights of each of the entrenchment proxies. Finally, Panel C 
provides the descriptive statistics for the derived proxies. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 
5.1. 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
i. C DNCENTR 1.00 
2. CONTROL. BLOCKS 0.36 1.00 
3. FAMILY BLOCKS 0.19 0.59 1.00 
4. FINANCIAL BLOCKS 0.21 0.62 -0.06 1.00 
5. PNONEXEC 0.07 0.08 0.10 -0.01 1.00 
6.13OARDSIZE -0.13 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.21 1.00 
7. CEO_DUALITY 0.01 -0.04 -0-03 -0-03 0.20 0.15 1.00 
8. FIXECOWNER -0.15 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.40 -0.25 -0.25 1.00 
9. TOTAL COMPENS. -0.15 -0.08 -0-07 -0.09 0.32 0.11 0.11 -0.28 1.00 
Panel B: Index Weight 
1 2 3 4 j 6 7 8 9 
ENTRENCHMET 1 -0.03 0.46 0.47 0.30 -0.48 0.51 
ENTRENCHMET 2 -0.20 -0.30 -0.15 -0.28 0.36 0.44 0.28 -0.39 0.50 
ENTRENCHMET 3 -0.44 -0.56 -0.28 -0.47 0.12 0.28 0.11 -0.12 0.34 
panel C. - Descri statisticsfor the ENTRENCHMENT 
Mean Yt., Uev. min 25% Median 75% Max Skewnes Kurfosis 
ENTRENCHMET 1 1 1.45 -4.14 0.14 1.15 1.98 5.08 -0.44 3.25 
ENTRENCHMET 2 1 1.52 -4.35 0.59 1.33 1.98 4.13 -1.08 3.66 
ENTRENCHMET 3 1 1.46 -4,59 0.11 1.14 1.98 5.10 -0.40 3.13 
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Table 5.4 
Univariate Results 
Panel A reports mean comparison of Asset Turnover (sales to assets)- analyzing high (above median) versus low 
(below median) ownership structure, board structure, compensation structure, managerial entrenchment and other firm 
characteristics. Panel B provides univariate mean comparisons of firm specific characteristics by asset turnover 
quartiles 0" vs. 4"' quartile). In both panels a t-test statistic is used to compare the mean difference. Definitions for all 
variables are provided in Table 5.1. and * indicate that the mean difference is statistically significant at the 
i %, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Panel A Panel B 
Asset turnover Asset turnover I St il h 
mean of above mean of below quart e 4 quartile 
variable variable 
West asset asset West 
median median turnover turnover 
Acc [)unting Variables 
DIVIDEND 1.348 1.054 11.14*** 1.07 2.88 -15.97*** 
. MKTBOOK 1.237 1.165 2.69*** 2.04 1.85 2.03 ** 
LEVF, RAGE 1.125 1.277 -5.69*** 20.37 14.01 8.03*** 
SHORTDEBT 1.165 0.787 35.96*** 35.58 47.23 
SIZE 1.179 1.223 -1.62 11.85 11.37 4.84$** 
ownership Structure 
CONCENTR (3%) 
CONCENTR (5%) 
3 LAPLGEST 
CONTROL. BLOCKS 
FAMILY BLOCKS 
FINANCIAL BLOCKS 
EXECOWNER 
Board structure 
RNONEXEC 
1.231 1.171 2.22** 36.45 36.17 0.29 
1.222 1.180 1.56 27.46 27.92 -0.51 
1.219 1.183 1.38 27.18 27.97 -1.06 
1.196 1.202 -0.17 20.39 23.77 -1.74* 
1.293 1.195 1.38 8.94 8.72 0.16 
1.170 1.204 -0.72 8.29 10.69 -1.75* 
1.294 1.108 7.00*** 7.63 12.02 -6.20*** 
1.115 1.261 -5.36*** 52.45 47.03 8.01*** 
BOARDSIZE 1.132 1.252 4.52*** 7.78 7.11 5.760** 
CEq_DUALITY 1.193 1.301 1.96* 10.80 7.42 2.52** 
Compensation structure 
SALARY 1.218 1.184 1.29 171569 170989 0.11 
COMPENSATION 1.224 1.179 1.39 275952 258171 1.56 
Entrenchment Proxies 
ENTRENCHMENT 1 1.156 1.246 -3.37*** 1.14 0.74 5.83*** 
EN-rRENCHMENT2 1.156 1.246 -3.35*** 0.88 0.85 0.43 
ENTRENCHMENT3 1.142 1.261 4.46*** 1.02 0.75 3.81*** 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
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The objective of this thesis is two fold. First, it investigates the adverse effects of the managcr- 
shareholder conflict on corporate strategy and value. Second, it attempts to provide more insights 
into the determination of those mechanisms that can ameliorate the agency conflict betwecn 
managers and shareholders. 
Using a large sample of UK listed firms, for which a unique database has been compiled, 
we show that agency issues have severe implications for capital structure choice and corporate 
performance. Specifically, in chapter 2 we show that firms with entrenched management indicate 
relatively low Tobin's Q ratios. Certain elements of corporate financial structure, managerial 
compensation structure and ownership and board structure can help attenuate the conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders, leading to a better corporate performance. It seems 
however that several of these elements (e. g. managerial ownership and managerial 
compensation) have an ambiguous effect on Tobin's Q. Most importantly, it seems that 
inanagerial ownership and managerial compensation are not independent mechanism but they 
work as substitute mechanisms for ameliorating agency conflicts. 
In chapter 3 we show how internal corporate governance influences the firms' capital 
structure choice. The analysis centres around the view that managerial incentives arc important 
in shaping up the capital structure of firms and the exact impact of these incentives on leverage 
are likely to be determined by firm-specific governance characteristics. To conduct our 
investigation of these issues, we construct a corporate governance measure using detailed 
ownership and governance information for a large sample of UK listed firms. The empirical 
findings indicate that better corporate governance practices reduce the agency costs of debt, 
leading to a higher leverage ratio. More importantly, in addition to its direct effect, there is 
evidence that corporate governance affects the firm financing policy decision indirectly, through 
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influencing managerial incentives to adjust to (or deviate from) an optimal leverage ratio. In 
particular, our flndings indicate that the aligriment effect of managerial ownership on leverage is 
less pronounced in well-govemed firms, possibly because managerial ownership and corporate 
governance work as substitute mechanisms for resolving agency issues. Furthermore, there is 
rather weak evidence that the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership is weaker in firms 
that possess strong corporate governance. Finally, consistent with the results reported in recent 
capital structure studies, our dynamic panel data models show that UK finns adjust partially 
towards a target leverage ratio. 
Chapters 4 and 5 concentrate on the empirical determinants of agency costs rather than 
focusing on a corporate performance or a particular corporate policy decision. Specifically, in 
chapter 4 we aim to extend the empirical literature on the determinants of agency costs by using 
a large sample of UK listed firms. To do so, we employ two alternative proxies for agency costs: 
the ratio of total sales to total assets (asset turnover) and the ratio of selling, general and 
administrative expenses to total sales (SG&A). In our analysis, we control for the influence of 
two potential internal governance mechanisms or devices that were ignored by previous studies, 
namely debt maturity and managerial compensation. We also examine the potential interactions 
between internal governance mechanisms and firm growth opportunities in determining agency 
costs. Our results reveal that the capital structure characteristics of firms, namely bank debt and 
debt maturity, constitute two of the most important corporate governance devices for UK 
companies. Also, managerial ownership, managerial compensation and ownership concentration 
seem to play an important role in mitigating agency costs. Finally, our results suggest that the 
impact exerted by specific internal governance mechanisms on agency costs varies with firms' 
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growth opportunities. Specifically, the alignment effect of managerial ownership seems to be 
more pronounced in the case of high-growth firms. 
Finally, Chapter 5 builds on the analysis of chapter 4 to investigate the relationship 
between managerial entrenchment and agency costs. Two key aspects of this chapter are the 
derivation of a uniquely constructed proxy for managerial entrenchment, which is based on a set 
of variables that are likely to affect managerial ability and incentives and expropriate wealth 
from shareholders, and the use of the dynamic panel data methodology, which allows us to study 
whether agency costs are persistent over time and, also, whether there is a level of agency costs 
that is perceived by managers as an equilibrium level of agency costs. The empirical findings 
indicate that there is a strong inverse (positive) relationship between our proxy for managerial 
entrenchment and asset turnover ratio (expense ratio). There is also evidence that short-tcrin dcbt 
and dividend payments work as effective corporate governance mechanisms or devices for UK 
firms. Finally, the findings reveal that agency costs are persistent over time. 
The main conclusions and implications of this thesis can be summarized as follows. The 
manager-shareholder conflict is costly for modem corporations, especially for those 
characterized by a distinct separation between ownership and control. The conflict is clearly 
reflected to asset turnover, expense ratio, capital structure choice and corporate performance. 
There are several strategies that firms can use to ameliorate the managcr-sharcholder conflict. 
These include changes in the ownership structure (e. g. level of managerial ownership), 
managerial compensation structure (e. g. level of salary) and financial structure (e. g. level of 
short-term debt and dividend ratio). These corporate governance mechanisms, however, do not 
work independently in reducing agency costs but there are complicated ways of reducing agency 
costs such that the impact of one mechanism depends on the chosen level of the other or other 
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firm-specific characteristics (e. g. the value of growth options). This finding casts doubt on earlier 
studies that treat several corporate governance mechanisms as exogenous. The results of this 
study also bring into question the results in previous studies that ignore endogeneity. 
Several lines for future research can be suggested. Firstly, there is a need to develop more 
sophisticated proxies for corporate governance and managerial entrenchment than those reported 
in this thesis. This progress can be made by considering not only internal control mechanisms but 
also external control mechanisms for measuring corporate governance and managerial 
entrenchment. One could use, for example, takeover readiness provisions such as poison pills 
and golden parachutes and constitutional provisions to prevent majority shareholders from 
having their way such as staggered boards and limits to shareholder bylaw amendments. Some 
efforts have been made within such a framework but the existing studies are restricted to US 
finns (see, e. g., Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005 and Gompers et al., 2003). 
Secondly, a natural extension of our work would be to investigate the implications of the 
manager-shareholder conflict on corporate policy decisions other than the capital structure. The 
first candidate is managerial compensation. Recent UK evidence clearly shows that exccutivc 
compensation (both cash-based and equity-based) has increased dramatically during the last 
decade. It is far from clear, however, whether such an increase is linked to better share price or 
whether high compensation packages reflect managerial power to garner overcompensation. One 
way to think about answering this question is to consider that entrenched managers havc the 
ability to extract high wages and larger perquisites from shareholders, and obtaining more 
latitude in determining corporate strategy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). 
Another corporate policy decision that is expected to be significantly influenced by the 
manager-shareholder conflict is the dividend decision. Unlike the findings of Fama and French 
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(2001), who observe a declining propensity to pay dividends, recent studies document an 
increasing propensity to pay dividends (see, for example, Ferris et al., 2006). It has also been 
realized that several firms have increased their dividend payments by rather more than growth 
opportunities alone justified. How can this phenomenon be explained? To what extent does 
rnanagerial short-termism and managerial entrenchment drive such an irrational corporate 
behavior? 
Thirdly, more research is needed on boards of directors. In the current thesis we have only 
investigated the effects of different board structures on capital structure and corporate 
performance. More contentious, however, is the question of what determines board effectiveness 
in large corporations. Which are the most important factors that drive the adoption/operation of 
specific board structures, mechanisms and practices? How can we develop measures of board 
effectiveness that incorporate the operations/processes which characterise boards? A few US 
studies focus on the role of board size and board composition in this regard. However, to what 
extent do factors such as ownership configuration (executive/board ownership, concentration, 
institutional ownership, etc. ), organisational characteristics (type, industry, age, leverage, 
growth, etc. ), board member characteristics (education, experience, reputation, etc. ) and general 
board characteristics (leadership, experience, diversity, etc. ) also influence board effectiveness? 
A satisfactory answer to these questions will enhance our understanding of several board 
practices and dynamics and, also, help identify any 'gaps' in governance. The results from such 
an investigation could be important for firms themselves when seeking to better 
understand/design their governance arrangements. Additionally, the research will be useful for 
external monitors (e. g., as part of their own appraisals of companies' governance), auditors (c. g., 
for governance/compliance risk analysis), fund managers (e. g., for voting decision analysis) and 
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regulators (e. g., as part of developing governance standards/policies and listing requirements). 
More broadly, in the context of the mixed governance-performance evidence mentioned above, 
the results will foster a richer characterisation of the linkage(s) between corporate govemancc 
and financial performance, to the extent that they provide a broader and more rigorous analysis 
of what 'good' governance involves and what its determinants might be. 
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